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A Media History of the (Digital?) Wunderkammer: A Case Study of Samuel Quiccheberg’s 
1565 Proposal for an Ideal Wunderkammer 
 
Catherine van Reenen 
 
 
The Wunderkammer—a collection of wonders peculiar to the late Renaissance in Europe—has 
recently become a popular metaphor for new digital media for its ability to challenge modern 
categories of knowledge. Given that very little has been written on the Wunderkammer—and 
virtually nothing from the perspective of media history—its newfound popularity in contemporary 
scholarship on digital media warrants a closer look at its history. This thesis examines the 
classification techniques and representational strategies of the late Renaissance Wunderkammer 
through a case study of a proposal for an ideal collection written by Samuel Quiccheberg in 1565. 
The case study serves as a point of entry into an analysis of the conditions that made the 
Wunderkammer an effective method of producing knowledge for sixteenth-century collectors, as 
well as provides an opportunity to identify historical discontinuities between phenomena now 
considered ‘media’. I conclude by outlining a number of ways in which future media histories of 
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This thesis develops a media history of the Wunderkammer, a form of collection during the late 
Renaissance in Europe that juxtaposed artificial and natural objects to represent the universe in 
microcosmic form. In doing so, the Wunderkammer grouped together seemingly unrelated objects, 
such as ancient religious relics with telescopes, scraps of metal with gold-plated nautilus shells, or 
handmade children’s toys with portraits by well-known artists. This method of display resulted in 
what appears today as motley assortment of items resulting from a naïve violation of the 
epistemological boundaries of modernity. Recently, the Wunderkammer’s strange method of 
classification (or lack thereof) has become of interest to scholars interested in the potential of 
digital media to challenge established knowledge-making practices. Some new media researchers 
have even described the Web as a ‘digital Wunderkammer’ for its ability to allow user-generated 
categories to drive the production and organization of heterogeneous content in a way that subverts 
traditional knowledge systems. I conceptualize these depictions of the Wunderkammer in 
contemporary scholarship on digital media as ‘remediations’—a term coined by Bolter and Grusin 
to describe how media reappropriate the techniques and meanings of other media. In examining 
the historiography of the Wunderkammer, I argue that its digital remediation tends to draw on a 
stereotype of it that reinforces an impoverished understanding of Renaissance epistemology and 
an ahistorical concept of media. In order to demonstrate this argument, I take up a case study of a 
1565 text written by Samuel Quiccheberg (a collections advisor for then-Duke of Bavaria, 
Albrecht V) on how to assemble a Wunderkammer. The goal of this case study is, first, to 
understand how the Wunderkammer became a useful method of generating and representing 
knowledge during the late Renaissance in Europe; and second, to identify historical discontinuities 
with respect to the concept of ‘media’ from the late Renaissance to the present.  
This thesis proceeds as follows: First, I introduce the Wunderkammer in more detail and 
explore the various ways in which it has re-emerged in contemporary scholarly discussions of 
digital media. I also explore some of the historical scholarship on the Wunderkammer in order to 
better understand its relevance to contemporary digital media and explain how my media-historical 
approach contributes to this literature. Chapter one introduces Quiccheberg’s Inscriptiones vel 






Quiccheberg’s proposal for a Wunderkammer—or what he also called a ‘universal theater’—in 
relation to certain cultural and philosophical transformations in sixteenth-century Europe, namely, 
a shift in the relationship between knowledge and experience, and the explosion of encyclopaedic 
activities. I argue that Quiccheberg’s Wunderkammer was a pragmatic response to the problem of 
deciphering the secret network of relations between the seemingly infinite things of the universe. 
Following from this conception of knowledge specific to the late Renaissance, chapter three 
analyzes the classification system Quiccheberg developed for his proposed collection. I 
demonstrate that not only was Quiccheberg’s Wunderkammer far from a disorderly agglomeration 
of random objects, it was in fact ordered meticulously through a complex set of reflexive 
categories. I conclude by reflecting on how the historical conditions that constituted Quiccheberg’s 
ideal Wunderkammer differ from those of contemporary digital media and discuss how the 
Wunderkammer might provide a productive point of entry into future media histories.  
 
 
The (Digital?) Wunderkammer 
The late Renaissance in Europe saw the proliferation of privately-owned collections of natural, 
artistic, and ethnographic items which were arranged and displayed in cupboards, cabinets, closets, 
and sometimes entire rooms and palaces. These Kunst- und Wunderkammern1 or art and wonder 
chambers, as they were called in Germany2 contained an array of diverse objects, such as seeds, 
maps, skeletons, coins, tapestries, minerals, scripture, and sculptures, which were arranged to 
represent nature’s plenitude in microcosmic form. While the contents and organization of 
individual Wunderkammern varied widely according to their owner’s preferences, means, and 
geographical location, a distinguishing trait of these early modern collections was their inclusion 
of both artificialia and naturalia. Rather than separating natural items from human-made artifacts, 
owners of Wunderkammern brought them together within a single collection. The idiosyncratic 
                                                      
1 I use the term ‘Wunderkammer’ for the sake of brevity throughout this thesis, but it is interchangeable with 
‘Kunstkammer’ or ‘Kunst- und Wunderkammer’ since these types of collections were closely associated and often 
fused together in a single space making them practically indistinguishable. The use of the abbreviated 
‘Wunderkammer’ in this project is meant to maintain consistency for the reader but also because1) this is the term 
that has resurfaced most prominently in contemporary discussions of digital media and 2) the specific case study I 
undertake here concerns a German author’s proposal for a collection of wonders of art and wonders of nature.  






arrangement of Wunderkammern deliberately highlighted such juxtapositions—not only between 
nature and art, but also between ancient and modern, divine and human, European and non-
European.3 (The Wunderkammer was one technique for managing the seemingly infinite 
expansion of foreign materials wrought by imperial expansion during the early modern period.)4 
Through this distinct style of arrangement, collectors strived to elicit a sense of wonder in viewers. 
Wonder, during the early modern period, referred simultaneously to a cognitive passion integral 
to learning and a discrete ontological category that held the secrets of God’s works.5  By generating 
and displaying ‘wonder’, the Wunderkammer served as a technique of inquiry into the divinely-
created universe specific to the Renaissance period.  
Nearly as ubiquitous as they were short-lived, collections of arts and wonders flourished 
throughout Europe—primarily in Germany, Italy, Austria, France, England—starting in the mid-
sixteenth century only to fall out of favour about a hundred years later. The decline of the 
Wunderkammer as a method of inquiry into the nature of the universe roughly coincides with the 
professionalization of the sciences throughout the seventeenth century. Gradually, wonders were 
shorn of their epistemic value—and became increasingly associated with the uncivilized vulgar 
masses—as natural historians and philosophers devised more rigid organizational strategies for 
collections, now increasingly specialized, institutional, and public rather than encyclopaedic, 
individual, and private.6 By the eighteenth century, these wonder-full collections were, for the 
most part, dismantled, analyzed, and categorized according to modern scientific taxonomies—that 
is, relatively stable systems of classifying objects and organisms on the basis of shared 
characteristics. By the nineteenth century, some of the contents of Wunderkammern found their 
way into newly established museums, libraries, universities, art galleries, and archives, while other 
                                                      
3 Eilean Hooper-Greenhill, Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 1992), 82; Lorraine 
Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750 (New York & Cambridge: Zone Books, 
1998), 255; Isabel Yaya, “Wonders of America: The Curiosity Cabinet as a Site of Representation and Knowledge,” 
Journal of the History of Collections 20.2 (2008): 174.  
4 Maria Zytaruk “Cabinets of Curiosities and the Organization of Knowledge,” University of Toronto Quarterly 80.1 
(2011),33; Yaya, “Wonders of America,” 185.  
5 Daston and Park, Wonders, 14.  
6 Steven Mullaney, “Strange Things, Gross Terms, Curious Customs: The Rehearsal of Cultures in the Late 
Renaissance,” Representations 3 (Summer, 1983): 40-41; Paula Findlen, Possessing Nature: Museums, Collecting, 
and Scientific Culture in Early Modern Italy (London; Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1994), 5; Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750 (New York: Zone 
Books, 1998), 343; Eilean Hooper-Greenhill, Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge (London and New York: 






objects were lost or destroyed. Looking back at the Renaissance Wunderkammer with modern 
eyes, it may appear as a product of category confusion—material evidence of an era on the verge 
of modernity, but not yet aware of the epistemological boundaries between, for example, art, 
religion, science, technology, and craft.  
The Wunderkammer’s proclivity for strange and surprising juxtapositions has recently 
become of interest to scholars working in various fields across the humanities and social sciences.  
Barbara Maria Stafford argues that Wunderkammern and digital media participate in a similar 
mode of knowledge production: each enables multiple user-directed methods of data collection 
and classification and displays heterogeneous information which appears to lack any hierarchical 
order, relying instead upon non-rational and often idiosyncratic principles of analogy, 
juxtaposition, and contiguity. In Stafford’s view, both digital media and the Wunderkammer invite 
users to make their own connections and impose their own methods of organization on information 
through visual interaction.  
Looking back from the perspective of the computer era, the artifacts in a Wunderkammer 
seem less physical phenomena and more material links permitting the beholder to retrieve 
complicated personal and cultural associations. Looking forward from the Enlightenment 
world of apparently miscellaneous pleasures, we discern that scraps of wood, stone, or 
metal, religious relics, ancient shards, exotic fetishes, animal remains, miniature portraits, 
small engravings, pages torn from a sketchbook, are the distant ancestors of today’s 
sophisticated software.7 
 
Horst Bredekamp likewise argues that the Kunstkammer—with its visual logic of association and 
lack of clearly defined boundaries between art, technology, and nature—is a crucial reference point 
for understanding ‘cyberspace’.8 Ostensibly, assembling a chamber of wonders is similar to 
curating a digital space: in each case, collectors or users decide for themselves what content is 
important to display and how to display it. They are also responsible for directing their experiences 
within each space, defining their own pathways through the potentially vast and diverse multi-
media elements inside, and drawing connections between them. Different people may make 
different ‘discoveries’ depending on their interests and idiosyncrasies, and these discoveries can 
then be added to the collection. The specific objects or information one encounters online or inside 
                                                      
7 Barbara Maria Stafford, Good Looking: Essays on the Virtue of Images (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 74-75.  
8 Horst Bredekamp, The Lure of Antiquity and the Cult of the Machine: The Kunstkammer and the Evolution of Art, 






a Wunderkammer may differ but the manner in which one encounters them is, ostensibly, similar. 
In this regard, the affinity between digital media and the Wunderkammer is based largely on formal 
similarities as opposed to content; they seem to share a similar mode of mediation in that they 
represent the world according to user-generated methods of classification.   
Echoing Stafford and Bredekamp’s arguments, some new media scholars refer to search 
engines, image hosting websites, or social networking sites as ‘digital Wunderkammern’.9 In these 
works, particular types of digital media are presented as new versions of the late Renaissance 
Wunderkammer. Robert Gehl, for example, describes YouTube as a Wunderkammer-like archive 
insofar as each flattens its content along a horizontal plane and lacks a centralized “curator of 
display.”10 In this sense, YouTube and the Wunderkammer both position their users as “extremely 
powerful curators in the process of categorization and classification.”11 However, Gehl warns that 
as YouTube’s curatorial practices are increasingly relinquished to entrepreneurs, media 
corporations, and other mediators, “they are refining ‘Internet video’ into another capitalist 
institution, just as professionalized curators refined Wunderkammers into the modern museum in 
the 18th century.”12  
Similarly, Melissa Terras describes image-hosting platform Flickr as a digital 
Wunderkammer, but she is less wary than Gehl about the potential for institutional mediators to 
co-opt the user-generated content of the Web. In fact, this potential for co-optation—or what Terras 
frames as cooperation—is precisely what she describes as the digital Wunderkammer’s main 
benefit. Terras challenges what she describes as the dominant view of the internet held by official 
cultural heritage institutions as a vast nonsense-making machine—that is, a digital 
Wunderkammer.13 She argues that by linking a ‘digital Wunderkammer’ like Flickr to official 
cultural heritage institutions, the “field of meaningless rubbish”14 created online by amateurs 
                                                      
9 Hubert Burda, The Digital Wunderkammer: 10 Chapters on the Iconic Turn (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2011), 
179; Robert Gehl, “YouTube as Archive: Who Will Curate This Digital Wunderkammer?” International Journal of 
Cultural Studies 12, no. 1 (2009): 45; Melissa Terras “The Digital Wunderkammer: Flickr as a Platform for Amateur 
Cultural and Heritage Content,” Literary and Linguistic Computing 59.4 (2011): 686.  
10 Robert Gehl, “YouTube as Archive: Who Will Curate This Digital Wunderkammer?” International Journal of 
Cultural Studies 12.1 (2009): 43.  
11 Ibid., 47.  
12 Ibid., 49.  
13 Terras, “The Digital Wunderkammer: Flickr as a Platform for Amateur Cultural and Heritage Content,” Literary 
and Linguistic Computing 59.4 (Spring 2011): 687-8. 






becomes relevant and useful to professional curators in their attempts to democratize museum 
collections. Despite their different views on the future of digital content curation, Gehl and Terras 
articulate a similar view in that, for them, the heuristic appeal of the Wunderkammer as an 
analogue for digital media lay precisely in that which made their 16th and 17th-century versions 
ineffective methods of knowledge production for 18th-century intellectuals as they sought to 
professionalize the sciences—namely, the Wunderkammer’s lack of firmly established categories 
and the absence of a unified classificatory system across individual collections. 
Other theorists describe the revival of the Wunderkammer as a structuring device in various 
art installations and museums and draw on it as a source of inspiration for new media art and digital 
collection practices.15 Michelle Henning points out a renewed interest in curiosity and wonder in 
contemporary display aesthetics, which she links to the institutional adoption of new digital media. 
In her view, Wunderkammern and digital media both involve “a turn toward networked and 
decentered knowledge, and a privileging of arbitrary associations and resonances.”16 For example, 
in Devices of Wonder: From the World in a Box to Images on Screen (a multi-media exhibition 
and accompanying book by the same name), Barbara Maria Stafford, Frances Terpak, and Isotta 
Poggi attempt to re-imagine the curiosity cabinet’s “epistemic organization by juxtaposition and 
superimposition of heterogeneous elements” through interactive digital exhibition practices.17 
Similarly, Susan Delagrange’s web-project entitled “Wunderkammer, Cornell, and the Visual 
Canon of Arrangement” (2006) draws on the sixteenth-century Wunderkammer in order to 
illustrate the inseparability of visual arrangement from invention in processes of knowledge 
production.18 
The ability of digital media to re-introduce the Wunderkammer’s idiosyncratic pathways 
of discovery, together with its relational and visual logics, is sometimes presented as an “antidote 
                                                      
15 Michelle Henning, Museums, Media and Cultural Theory, Series: Issues in Cultural and Media Studies 
(Maidenhead & New York: Open University Press, 2006), 153; Anna Munster, Materializing New Media: 
Embodiment in Information Aesthetics, (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2011),12; Stafford and Terpak, 
Devices of Wonder, 3.  
16 Michelle Henning, Museums, Media and Cultural Theory (Maidenhead, England; New York: Open University 
Press, 2006), 154.  
17 Barbara Maria Stafford, Frances Terpak, and Isotta Poggi, Devices of Wonder: From the World in a Box to 
Images on a Screen (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2001), 3; See 
https://www.getty.edu/art/exhibitions/devices/flash/ for a digital version of the installation.  
18 Susan Delagrange, “Wunderkammer, Cornell, and the Visual Canon of Arrangement,” Kairos: A Journal of 






to the hyperrational claims of taxonomic systems and systematic organization in general.”19 In this 
view, the Wunderkammer’s apparent category confusion serves as inspiration for alternative 
methods of knowledge production: blurring the boundaries between categories that are typically 
(or properly) separate—such as nature and  culture, human-made or natural, or art and science—
illustrates the contingent nature of our own methods for ordering and producing knowledge and 
suggests how things might be otherwise.20  
As these examples illustrate, the late Renaissance Wunderkammer’s methods of 
classification and representation are especially intriguing to scholars interested in the potential of 
digital media to challenge or improve contemporary methods of knowledge production. The re-
emergence of the Wunderkammer in these contemporary scholarly discourses can thus be 
understood as a process of remediation. Remediation, as Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin 
explain, refers to the representation (whether obvious or subtle) of any medium in another 
medium.21 The re-emergence of the Wunderkammer in relation to digital media suggests that the 
“techniques, forms, and social significance”22 of the Wunderkammer are being reappropriated in 
an attempt to improve digital media. The literatures discussed above might thus be understood as 
examples of the digital remediation of the Wunderkammer. 
Although remediation, in Bolter and Grusin’s view, is a defining feature of digital media, 
it has been a condition of mediation since at least the Renaissance. In fact, the authors point to the 
Wunderkammer as a good example of Renaissance ‘hypermediacy’—that is, a strategy of 
remediation that not only acknowledges but celebrates the mediated nature of representation 
itself.23 Hypermediacy is a counterbalance to the other strategy of remediation, which Bolter and 
Grusin name ‘immediacy’. While hypermediacy actively calls attention to the act of mediation, 
immediacy operates by making the medium withdraw from view in order to make the mediated 
                                                      
19 Mark A. Meadow in Preface to Samuel Quiccheberg’s Inscriptiones, viii.  
20 See Maggie MacLure, The Bone in the Throat: Some Uncertain Thoughts on Baroque Method,” International 
Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 19.6 (2006): 729-745; MacLure, “The Wonder of Data,” Cultural 
Studies →Critical Methodologies 13.4 (2013): 228-232; “Richard Philips, “Curious about Others: Relational and 
Empathetic Curiosity for Diverse Societies,” New Formations (2015): 123-142; and Dorthe Staunæs & Jette Kofoed, 
“Producing Curious Affects: Visual Methodology as an Affecting and Conflictual Wunderkammer,” International 
Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 28, no. 10 (November 26, 2015): 1229–48. 
21 Ibid., 45 
22 Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 
65.  






content appear as if it is really present. Digital hypermedia, such as computers, web browsers, and 
social media applications, offer a space in which “representation is conceived of not as a window 
on to the world, but rather as ‘windowed’ itself—with windows that open on to other 
representations of other media.”24 As such, they seem to remediate the heterogeneous space of the 
Wunderkammer with its multiple surfaces, chests, frames, drawers, and containers.  
For Bolter and Grusin, a key implication of the concept of remediation is that new media 
are never fully ‘new’. “What is new about new media comes from the particular ways in which 
they refashion older media and the ways in which older media refashion themselves to answer the 
challenges of new media.”25 In other words, remediation is not a linear process: old media 
influence new media—or become their contents, as McLuhan famously argued—but new media 
retroactively shape old media, too. How, then, does the digital remediation of the Wunderkammer 
retroactively influence its history?  A closer look at existing scholarly literature on the 
Wunderkammer will help to elucidate the historical effects of its digital remediation.  
 
A Brief Historiography of the Wunderkammer 
The earliest known historical analysis of the Wunderkammer is Julius von Schlosser’s 1908 Die 
Kunst- und Wunderkammern der Spätrenaissance which, in John Hanson’s reading, traced the 
origins of the Wunderkammer back to ancient and medieval church treasuries and, in doing so, 
provided one of the first museologies.26 In his analysis of Rudolf II’s royal collection, Thomas 
DaCosta Kaufmann argues that von Schlosser “regarded [the Wunderkammer] as a kind of circus 
sideshow lacking any organizational principle or orderly display. Unicorn horns and magic stones 
are said to have been heaped up alongside great paintings by Durer and Brueghel throughout the 
rooms of the imperial castle in Prague.”27 Similarly, Eilean Hooper-Greenhill observes that 
historians initially approached the Wunderkammer “as a disordered jumble of unconnected 
                                                      
24 Ibid., 34.  
25 Ibid., 15.  
26 John Hanson, “Two Scenes from the Prehistory of the Byzantine Blockbuster,” in Wonderful Things: Byzantium 
Through Its Art, eds. Antony Eastmond and Liz James (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 34.  
27 Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann, “Remarks on the Collections of Rudolf II: The Kunstkammer as a Form of 
Representatio,” in The Origins of Museums: The Cabinet of Curiosities in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth- Century 






objects, many of which were fraudulent in character” and thus understood it as “the product of a 
saturnine disordered mind, where superstition and magic combine with ‘pre-scientific stirrings.’”28  
Despite its perceived lack of order or coherence, the Wunderkammer has typically been 
regarded as an example of the Renaissance era’s spirit of inquiry for its (noble but ultimately failed) 
attempt to advance human kind through the pursuit of knowledge. As such, historians after von 
Schlosser approached the Wunderkammer as a predecessor of the modern museum, emerging 
around the 19th century, and understood it to represent an intermediary phrase in the formation of 
modern scientific disciplines.29 The majority of scholarship on the Wunderkammer thus examines 
the establishment and development of particular scholarly collections or those established as part 
of royal courts, as in Oliver Impey and Arthur MacGregor’s 1985 edited volume of cabinet 
histories, the publication of which led to the founding of the Journal of the History of Collections. 
Through the meticulous examination of catalogues, inventories, engraved illustrations of 
Wunderkammern, and correspondences between collectors, merchants, and scholars, and other 
primary sources, historians have been able to identify the contents of specific collections, which 
often changed as they were inherited or purchased by other collectors. Sometimes these descriptive 
histories trace the social lives of objects from their inclusion in Wunderkammern to their transfer 
to more specialized natural history collections and eventual incorporation into nineteenth-century 
museums.30 Indeed, many of the same objects displayed in Wunderkammern—astronomical 
instruments, texts, sculptures, fossils, utensils, shells, skeletons, and other items—were preserved 
and carried over into museum collections and provided empirical evidence for scholars working 
in anthropology, history, geology, and biology, among other disciplines.31  
However, many other items were not transferred to modern museum collections, especially 
those that did not fit into the epistemological frameworks of modern disciplines. In the shuffle of 
                                                      
28 Hooper-Greenhill, Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge, 79.  
29 Eilean Hooper-Greenhill, Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge, 79; Oliver Impey and Arthur Macgregor, The 
Origins of Museums: The Cabinet of Curiosities in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth- Century Europe (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1985) 1; Joy Kenseth, The Age of the Marvelous (Hanover & New Hampshire: Hood Museum of Art & 
Dartmouth College, 1991) 247; Pomian, Collectors and Curiosities, 63-4.  
30 For excellent examples of this meticulous work see Barbara Jeane Balsiger, “The Kunst- und Wunderkammern: A 
Catalogue Raisonne of Collecting in Germany, France and England, 1565-1750,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Pittsburgh, 1970 and Paul Grinke, From Wunderkammer to Museum (London: Bernard Quaritch, 2006). 
31 Findlen, Possessing Nature, 232; Steven Mullaney, “Strange Things, Gross Terms, Curious Customs: The 






things, the Wunderkammer began increasingly to figure as a ‘beta version’ of the museum, insofar 
as it shared the same basic function of classifying and representing the world, but attempted to do 
so on the basis of what were thought to be erroneous assumptions about the nature of the universe 
and thus failed to develop a proper classification system or taxonomy.32 According to Paul Grinke, 
“Taxonomy is surely the key to the progression from the private cabinet to the public museum: the 
idea of the collection as an Ark, a toy box of treasures and playthings, gradually gives way to a 
systematic codification of objects for academic research and public enlightenment.”33 The 
inclusion of incorrectly identified items (e.g. dinosaur bones, which were thought to belong to 
giants, and narwhal tusks which were labeled as unicorn horns) and especially mythical and 
supernatural elements (e.g. relics, monsters, and images depicting Christian miracles) has 
contributed to the characterization of the Wunderkammer as a quaint and misguided attempt to 
classify and represent the natural world.34 Retrospectively, then, the museum appears as the 
winning model for its more ‘rational’ (i.e. secular) and ‘public’ (i.e. institutionally governed) 
techniques of knowledge production.  
Although it is true that many of the objects today found in museums were once displayed 
in Wunderkammern, the account of the Wunderkammer as a predecessor of the modern museum 
is based on the implicit assumption of the linear development of technologies. As a result, this 
view reaffirms established points of rupture and closure in hegemonic narratives of Western 
modernity, such as the transition from an oral to a literate society with the invention of the printing 
press and the association of the increased availability of printed texts with individualism, 
democracy, and science.35 More recently, some scholars have begun to re-examine the 
Wunderkammer as a site of cultural activity distinct from the museum and to analyze its techniques 
of classification and display within the context of Renaissance epistemology.36 Steven Mullaney, 
for example, contends that “a wonder-cabinet is not a museum, not even a vague or half-formed 
gesture toward one” since, despite sharing many of the same objects in their displays, their criteria 
                                                      
32 Impey and MacGregor, The Origins of Museums, 1. 
33 Grinke, Wunderkammer to Museum, 10.  
34 Hooper-Greenhill, Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge, 79.  
35 Lisa Gitelman, Always Already New: Media, History, and the Data of Culture (Cambridge & London: MIT Press, 
2006), 3-4.  
36 Stephanie Jane Bowry, “Re-Thinking the Curiosity Cabinet: A Study of Visual Representation in Early and Post-






for selection and strategies of organization and display differ significantly. Similarly, Hooper-
Greenhill’s analysis takes into account the representational strategies, epistemological principles, 
and intellectual frameworks of the Renaissance, and thus illustrates that “the ‘cabinets of curiosity’ 
are far more than the miscellaneous products of disordered minds, but also that these ‘direct 
ancestors’ of modern museums were constituted from within a quite different frame of 
reference.”37  
Failing to take seriously the concepts and practices that were constitutive of (and 
constituted by) the Wunderkammer’s historical specificity risks remaking the past as a reflection 
of the present. As such, some historians are critical of the ways in which the Wunderkammer has 
re-emerged in contemporary discourses. Bruce Robertson observes that contemporary depictions 
of the Wunderkammer tend to over-emphasize its apparent disorder. He explains, “Contemporary 
curiosity cabinets are generally presented to overwhelm the modern viewer with an irrational 
dazzle of objects—trivial, overmanipulated, found, obscure, and anything but explicable.”38 The 
Wunderkammer’s display of heterogeneous content in a manner lacking a consistent overarching 
order is precisely why it has been used as an analogue for digital media. In other words, in its 
digital remediations, the Wunderkammer’s inexplicability is essential to its heuristic function. 
Echoing Robertson’s critique, David L. Martin argues that contemporary depictions of the 
Wunderkammer may result in simplistic and ahistorical explanations of Renaissance epistemology 
because “[t]he implicit logic here is that the ‘curiosity’ of the Renaissance can be ‘known’ to us 
today, merely through the assemblage of physical objects in an arrangement lacking in modern 
taxonomic hierarchies.”39 According to this logic, Renaissance knowledge is defined in terms of 
an absence of modern categories, rather than as an alternative epistemological framework.  
 With these critiques in mind, it is worth dwelling on whether digital remediations of the 
Wunderkammer retroactively authorize an impoverished understanding of Renaissance 
epistemology. Although the Wunderkammer may appear to modern eyes to violate 
epistemological boundaries, it is important to remember that these are our boundaries and may not 
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have applied to the concepts or practices of sixteenth-century collectors. In describing the 
Wunderkammer as an analogue for digital media on the basis of its apparent lack of rigid 
hierarchies and resulting display of heterogeneous information, contemporary authors may—
however unwittingly—be promulgating an inaccurate understanding of the Wunderkammer. The 
celebration of the apparent dis-order of the Wunderkammer may reinforce its characterization as 
an arbitrary assemblage of unrelated objects, despite the fact that this characterization is based on 
a poor understanding of the specific classification techniques used by Renaissance collectors to 
represent the world. Thus, by focusing on the historical conditions in which the Wunderkammer 
became a useful method of representing the universe, this thesis aims to develop a media history 




A Media-Historical Approach to the Wunderkammer: Studying Media Before Media 
(Studies) 
 
At the time of this writing, the only media theorist to have critically addressed the emergence of 
the ‘digital Wunderkammer’ is Wolfgang Ernst. In his introductory lecture for the 2015 academic 
conference of Ultima Contemporary Music Festival in Oslo, Ernst takes up the apparent return of 
the Wunderkammer in digital media and asks, “Is this simply a superficial nostalgia for a non-
classificatory, rather similarity-based ‘order of things’ as practiced in Renaissance and [Baroque] 
times (Foucault), or does this recursion indicate a deep-structural affinity between the 
Wunderkammer and the dynamics of the Internet?”40 Ernst wastes no time in answering his own 
(rather loaded) question: he dismisses the comparison on the grounds that there is no structural 
affinity between the Wunderkammer and the Internet and, therefore, asserts that its re-emergence 
today is a symptom of nostalgia. 41 Ernst’s assertion makes more sense in the context of his broader 
position on premodern media—namely, that there are none. As Anne Marie Rasmussen and 
Markus Stock explain, for Ernst and other proponents of an “information-technological approach” 
to the study of media, “the term media cannot be applied to the conditions of premodern 
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materialities of communication at all because these remain fundamentally bound to direct human 
involvement.”42 For Ernst, the Wunderkammer’s dependence on human processing power makes 
it premodern and thus incomparable to modern media technologies capable of storing, processing, 
and transmitting information directly. In this view, all discussions of premodern media are 
characterized by what Ernst calls ‘Mediennostalgie’ for their anachronistic application of an 
analytic concept that, in his view, has no relevance for the study of phenomena that precede the 
advent of modern electronic media.43 Ernst’s claim that the re-emergence of the Wunderkammer 
in digital media can be chalked up to scholars’ nostalgia for a non-classificatory, non-systematized 
era must be understood in terms of this strict conceptual division between premodern and modern 
methods of storing, processing, and transmitting information. 
As Ernst makes clear, the remediation of the Wunderkammer poses a methodological 
dilemma for the media historian: Can the term ‘media’ be retroactively applied to phenomena from 
an historical period that precedes the invention of the concept as an analytic tool, and if so, how 
can this be done in a way that avoids remaking the past in the image of the present? As Ernst, 
Robertson, and Martin point out, new media projects that take their inspiration from the 
Wunderkammer tend to rely on a reductionist view of Renaissance epistemology and thus produce 
ahistorical results. A major implication of these authors’ critiques is that in curatorial, theoretical, 
and artistic attempts to recreate the ‘wonder’ (in the sixteenth-century sense of a cognitive passion 
essential to inquiry) of the Wunderkammern for contemporary researchers, as well as gallery and 
museum visitors, the apparent continuities between the late Renaissance and the present are 
overemphasized to the neglect of significant cultural and historical distinctions. The stereotype of 
the Wunderkammer as a hodgepodge of miscellany items, although potentially useful as a heuristic 
device for research on (and with) new digital media, is nevertheless the product of an ahistorical 
understanding of Renaissance epistemology. Indeed, the term ‘media’ was used differently by 
sixteenth and seventeenth century intellectuals from how it is used in academic discourse today. 
As Wendy Hui Kyong Chun observes,  
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In terms of media, histories that reach from the Renaissance to the present day elide the 
fact that: one, although the word medium does stretch across this time period, its meaning 
differs significantly throughout; two, the plural-singular term ‘media’ marks a significant 
discontinuity. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), media stems from the 
Latin medium meaning middle, center, midst, intermediate course, intermediary (hence 
medium/average height and spiritual medium). In the fifteenth century, medium emerged 
as an intervening substance in English, stemming from the post-classical Latin phrase per 
medium (through the medium of) in use in British sources since the thirteenth century. 
The term ‘media’ (as opposed to mediums or medium) is linked to mass media: in the 
eighteenth century, paper was a medium of circulation, as was money; in the nineteenth 
century, electricity was a medium; in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, media 
emerged as the term to describe inexpensive newspapers and magazines and, in an affront 
to English and Latin, became a singular noun.44 
 
At the time when the Wunderkammer emerged in the sixteenth century, it would not have been 
understood as a medium in our current sense of a meaning-carrying vessel used to communicate 
specific units of information to multiple people simultaneously. Indeed, this understanding of 
media obscures other discontinuities through its entanglement with the terms ‘communication’ and 
‘information’. As Peters explains, our word ‘communication’ comes from the Latin 
‘communicare’ which means “to impart, share, or make common.”45 In its Latin sense, “to 
‘communicate’ is an act of receiving, not of sending; more precisely, it is to send by receiving.”46 
This sense of ‘communication’ as imparting hints at the Latin etymology of ‘information’ which 
derives from ‘informer’ and, according to Bernard Geoghegan, “denoted the imparting of form 
onto matter.”47 ‘Communication’, as we use it today, generally refers to the reciprocal exchange 
of ideas between human senders and receivers. As such, ‘information’ usually refers to stable units 
of data that can be transferred through multiple channels to various locations without degradation 
or interference. During the medieval and early modern periods, however, European authors most 
commonly employed the terms ‘media’, ‘communication’, and ‘information’ in their Latin-derived 
senses—and often in Latin. Even if we take a broad view of media—as ‘middle’ or ‘intervening 
substance’—sixteenth and seventeenth century collectors had different expectations about their 
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effects, operations, and uses. Furthermore, “we are talking about a mediality that is not yet 
accompanied by a coherent discourse on its own conditions.”48 In other words, while there were—
of course—such things as premodern media in the sense of intervening substances that could 
“amplify, convey, or channel a force or power” and thereby “create the illusion of immediacy,”49 
there was no established scholarly discourse dedicated exclusively to the study of these 
phenomena. The late Renaissance Wunderkammer was never understood as a ‘medium’ or as 
belonging to an analytic category of phenomena called ‘media’ that coincides precisely with our 
current use of the term. The Wunderkammer emerged, flourished, and disintegrated “before the 
realization of communication as a discourse, before the materialization of devices capable of 
automatic storage, processing, and transmission, and before the formation of information theory 
as a means of understanding and optimizing these developments.”50 If these are the criteria by 
which one defines media then analyzing Wunderkammern as media does indeed smack of 
anachronism.  
Ernst’s assertion that the digital remediation of the Wunderkammer is merely a symptom 
of nostalgia strikes me as more of an accusation than an explanation. With this label, Ernst not 
only dismisses the ‘digital Wunderkammer’ but also characterizes the study of medieval and early 
modern media as sentimental—and therefore ahistorical and illegitimate—on the basis of what is 
ultimately a conceptual disagreement over what is meant by the term ‘media’.51  While I agree that 
drawing hasty and unqualified analogies between ‘old’ and ‘new’ media from any historical period 
leads to an impoverished understanding of each—especially as doing so tends produce an image 
of the past that looks rather conspicuously like the present—I find Ernst’s embargo on the study 
of media before the advent of modern electronic forms of storing, processing, and transmitting 
information to be far too limiting. Although many of the digital remediations of the 
Wunderkammer are indeed based in a rather ahistorical understanding of its role in late 
Renaissance culture, this is not an inevitable result but one that suggests that the historiography of 
the Wunderkammer needs to be reexamined and reconstructed (which is to say ‘remediated’). 
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Prohibiting the study of media before the advent of modern electronic forms is an inappropriate 
treatment for the ‘symptom’ of nostalgia, not only because the ahistorical view of the 
Wunderkammer as an irrational method of classifying the world derives from disciplines other 
than media studies, but also because if the Wunderkammer’s re-emergence is a symptom of 
nostalgia then this symptom is precisely the phenomenon in need of explanation. Nostalgia is an 
effect—not a cause—of a lack of historical specificity.  
Medieval historian Erik Born suggests a more productive approach to the study of media 
before the advent of ‘the media’ or ‘media studies’, which—unlike Ernst’s—does not render the 
premodern period one of ‘amediality’ and thereby reinforce existing divisions between the 
medieval and modern periods, as well as the disciplinary boundaries between the people who study 
them.52 If the aim is to avoid retrojecting our own analytic categories into distinct historical periods 
in order to respect their “medial alterity”53 then I think a more constructive approach might, as 
Born suggests, “take up the apparent similarity between forms of medieval mediality and those of 
the present, precisely in order to clarify distinctions between historical periods and make historical 
differences visible.”54 By ‘mediality’, Born refers to the conditions through which a particular 
thing comes to function as a mediator in the broad sense of coming between to represent something 
else. An approach that focuses on mediality rather than particular media seems especially 
productive in terms of discerning how our modern concepts of media—as well as communication 
and information—differ qualitatively from those of other eras, rather than just taking their 
differences for granted or assuming that these differences are so radical as to be utterly inaccessible 
to modern forms of analysis. The study of past methods for the creation and circulation of 
representations can serve as a helpful reminder that our current assumptions about the uses of 
specific media, as well as the way we talk conceptualize ‘media’ as an analytic category, are all 
but neutral or given.  
Following Mullaney and Hooper-Greenhill’s critiques of the stereotype of the 
Wunderkammer as a misguided proto-museum, I develop a media history of the Wunderkammer 
in order to clarify the conditions that made it epistemologically productive during the late 
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Renaissance in Europe. How was knowledge conceived of by participants in the sixteenth-century 
culture of collecting? Why was a collection of artificialia and naturalia necessary to achieve this 
type of knowledge? What cultural assumptions gave rise to the Wunderkammer’s seemingly 
strange techniques of classification and representation? These questions are undoubtedly shaped 
by present concerns about media, not least of which includes the recent resurgence of interest in 
the Wunderkammer and its apparent similarities to digital media. As Walter Benjamin recognized, 
“The present determines where, in the object from the past, that object’s forehistory and after-
history diverge so as to circumscribe its nucleus.”55 Benjamin’s point about historical objects 
reminds us that the emergence (and reemergence) of any medium is always based in a specific 
moment. Indeed, as Gitelman insists, in media history “[s]pecificity is key.”56 Thus, rather than 
write broadly about chambers of arts and wonders as if they were “immutable objects with given, 
self-defining properties”57—a strategy that has undoubtedly contributed to some of the 
historiographical problems discussed here—I take up a specific case study as an entry point into 
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Inscriptiones vel tituli theatri amplissimi… by Samuel Quiccheberg 
 
 
In 1575—four years before his death—Albrecht V, Duke of Bavaria, wrote a letter to the Queen 
of Spain requesting exotic objects to add to his collection of art and wonders.58 Such requests were 
common among members of the noble class, many of whom were also in the process of developing 
their own Kunst- and Wunderkammern and thus welcomed the exchange of gifts between royal 
courts as a way of expanding their collections. The Duke had been gathering items for his 
collection at Munich since at least 1563, when construction on the building to house these ‘exotic 
objects’, among other things, had begun.59 An inventory of the Munich Kunstkammer prepared by 
lawyer Johann Baptist Fickler in 1598 reports that it held over 6,000 items, many of which were 
likely received as gifts or donations.60 By that time, the entire collection—including the 
Kunstkammer, antiquarium, Schatzkammer (treasure chamber), and library—had been passed 
down to Albrecht’s son, Wilhelm V (who had requested the inventory), and spanned a four-winged 
multi-storied building surrounding a courtyard. The Kunstkammer occupied the entire top floor of 
the building in which there were 3,400 distinct locations with items displayed throughout on tables, 
walls, panels, cabinets, and shelves.61 The north wing of the building was the longest and as the 
starting point for tours of the Kunstkammer, it held some of the most impressive and valuable 
items of the entire collection, including a large coin collection and portraits of various rulers 
throughout history, ranging from antiquity to Albrecht’s lifetime. The north wing also provided a 
vantage point from which the ruler’s palace could be seen through a window.62  
In addition to coins and portraits, the collection contained natural specimens, such as 
fossils, shells, and animal bones, as well as ‘magico-medical’ items like bezoars and unicorn horns, 
and a small selection of scientific instruments including mechanical clocks and drawing 
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instruments.63 Some of the more ‘exotic objects’ displayed in the Munich Kunstkammer included 
ethnographic artifacts taken from colonial expeditions to the New World, such as: “Sinhalese ivory 
fans or Malayan palm-leaf fans; a feather mosaic panel by the Purhépecha from Michoacán 
showing the picture of a woman; a gourd which served as a container; a chess-board with mother-
of-pearl inlays from Gujarat; a Turkish leather bottle” and a “figure made of fruits and seeds 
representing a deity, said to be from Mexico.”64 These items in particular demonstrate Duke 
Albrecht’s preference for “natural specimens which retained their original form but which were 
assembled into artificial formations.”65 They also reflect the encyclopaedic ambitions of his 
collection: it was to be a miniature representation of the entire world—a microcosm. And since 
the ‘entire world’ had recently revealed itself to be much larger than previously thought—thanks 
in part to the invention of new instruments for deep-sea navigation—items from the Americas were 
of particular interest to collectors who could afford them.66 In contrast to older types of courtly 
collections, the Munich Kunstkammer developed a style of arrangement that did not confine 
particular types of objects or materials to specific places within the collection, but dispersed them 
throughout in a way that allowed, for example, maps to mingle with sculptures, relics with 
telescopes, and ancient bows with sixteenth-century swords. 
Although he did not live to see the completion of the Munich Kunstkammer, Flemish 
physician Samuel Quiccheberg was largely responsible for convincing Albrecht V to develop this 
collection of art and wonders, as well as for devising plans for how it should be assembled and 
used. These plans can be found in a 64-page text by Quiccheberg published in 1565, two years 
before his death. Quiccheberg’s text, fully translated into English in 2013 by Bruce Robertson and 
Mark A. Meadow, is a how-to manual for setting up and developing a Kunst- and Wunderkammer. 
The full title of Quiccheberg’s proposal, which doubles as an abstract, is as follows:  
Inscriptiones or titles of the most ample Theater that houses exemplary objects and 
exceptional images of the entire world, so that one could rightly call it a: repository of 
artificial and marvelous things, and of every rare treasure, precious object, construction, 
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and picture. It is recommended that these things be brought together here in the theater so 
that by their frequent viewing and handling one might quickly, easily, and confidently be 
able to acquire a unique knowledge and admirable understanding of things.67 
 
Most striking, of course, is the conspicuous lack of the terms ‘Kunstkammer’ or ‘Wunderkammer’ 
in the title of Quiccheberg’s work (hereafter referred to in abbreviated form as simply 
Inscriptiones). What he was proposing was a relatively new phenomenon and, as such, one of 
Quiccheberg’s rhetorical tasks was to adapt the existing vernacular of collecting to the novel 
collection he envisioned.68 His most frequently used label for the proposed collection was 
‘theater’—the etymology, usage, and cultural significance of which will be explored in detail in 
chapter two—a term commonly used by sixteenth-century authors to refer to “a writing devoted 
to the organization of human knowledge.”69 While Quiccheberg does not employ the term ‘Kunst- 
and Wunderkammer’ until the end of his treatise, his titular description of the proposed collection 
as ‘a repository of artificial and marvelous things’ hints at this sixteenth-century neologism. 
Although the exact coinage of ‘Kunst- and Wunderkammer’ is unknown, Quiccheberg’s 
Inscriptiones contains one of its earliest known usages.70  
Despite its German authorship, Inscriptiones was written in Latin, indicating that 
Quiccheberg imagined his audience to be comprised of educated readers. It was written and 
published while Quiccheberg was serving as an artistic advisor for Albrecht V, and includes praise-
filled references to the Bavarian Duke throughout, suggesting that the text served as a tenure 
application or grant proposal in addition to being a primer for potential collectors. Quiccheberg’s 
text provides copious practical instructions for how one might assemble an ‘ample theater’ or 
Kunst- and Wunderkammer. The text is divided into six sections: the first provides an overview 
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of the classification system Quiccheberg designs for the proposed Kunst- and Wunderkammer, in 
which he surveys the collectability of the universe, offering examples of the kinds of items one 
might display in  the theater; the second describes how the proposed collection fits into the existing 
court apparatus; the third provides some brief recommendations and additional advice for the 
would-be collector; the fourth, called “Digressions and Clarifications,” elaborates on various 
inscriptions of the theater; the fifth, “Exemplars,” includes Quiccheberg’s praise for established 
collections and their owners, as well as acknowledgements for those who have helped him to 
complete Inscriptiones; the sixth and final section contains biblical excerpts and dedicatory poems 
in praise of Quiccheberg’s proposed collection. 
As one of the only extant writings on Kunst- and Wunderkammern from the late sixteenth 
century, and as the earliest known work on how to assemble, classify, and display a collection of 
artificialia and naturalia, Quiccheberg’s text provides a valuable example of how wonder 
chambers were understood during the late Renaissance period. Motivated in part by the author’s 
familiarity with many of the most well-known European collections of the period, Quiccheberg’s 
Inscriptiones develops a detailed classification system for the proposed collection and provides 
lengthy elaborations on the function and utility of a Wunderkammer. Unlike the catalogues and 
inventories that are typically used to inquire into the history of collections, Quiccheberg’s 
Inscriptiones is a proposal for an ideal Wunderkammer and, as such, does not describe an existing 
collection.71 Indeed, Paula Findlen deems Quiccheberg’s Wunderkammer a “paper fantasy” since, 
based on historical evidence, it was never actually materialized in brick and mortar.72 As David L. 
Martin explains, “Quiccheberg’s Inscriptiones never acted as the blueprint for an actual cabinet; 
rather, it was more likely to have acted as a commentary on the cabinets: a written interpretation 
of the act of interpreting through material collection.”73 In other words, Quiccheberg’s 
Inscriptiones never served as an actual installation plan for a single collection—not even the 
Munich Kunstkammer of his boss, Albrecht V. In fact, there is no extant evidence with which to 
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gauge the influence of Quiccheberg’s Inscriptiones; it seems likely that the text was neither widely 
disseminated, nor well known by word of mouth during its authors’ lifetime.74  
Although Quiccheberg’s Inscriptiones was largely ignored by or unknown to his sixteenth-
century contemporaries, it began to garner prestige once it was discovered by twentieth-century 
museologists. Its historiography follows much the same pattern as that of the Wunderkammer in 
general. Quiccheberg’s ideal Wunderkammer is usually interpreted as an adolescent version of the 
more mature museum.75 Lorenz Seelig regards Quiccheberg’s Inscriptiones as “the first purely 
museological tract.”76 Robertson and Meadow reinforce this lineage in titling their English 
translation of Quiccheberg’s work The First Treatise on Museums (curiously, they use this title 
despite critiquing the museological reading of Quiccheberg’s text in their preface and 
introduction). Similarly, Kiersten F. Latham and John E. Simmons claim that Quiccheberg’s 
guidelines for the organization of a Wunderkammer “classified objects into groups that correlate 
with modern museum divisions: material glorifying the founder and handcrafts from antiquity 
(historic objects), natural specimens (natural history materials), technical and cultural objects 
(applied arts and crafts), and paintings and sacred objects (fine art).”77 However, the similarity 
between museum contents and that of the Wunderkammer obscures hefty distinctions with regard 
to the rationale that underpins Quiccheberg’s ideal collection, as well as the way in which he 
envisioned it to be used. As Stephen Mullaney puts it, “The museum as an institution rises from 
the ruins of such collections…it organizes the wonder-cabinet by breaking it down.”78 Whereas 
today there are separately-housed modern museums of, for example, natural history, fine art, and 
technology, Quiccheberg envisioned these collections within a single space—one not necessarily 
open to the public—and for a different purpose. Furthermore, even though Quiccheberg’s use of 
the term ‘museum’ to refer to specialized subcollections contained in the theater seems to suggest 
an historical continuity, his specific categories and his understanding of the purpose of 
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classification expose significant discontinuities—explored in chapter three—which have been 
largely elided in museological treatments of Inscriptiones.  
Only recently have the specificities of the collection that Quiccheberg proposed begun to 
be reinterpreted in ways that challenge the museological tradition. Koji Kuwakino, in the first 
analysis of Inscriptiones in its entirety, argues that Quiccheberg’s ‘museum-theater’ was one that 
operated through particular epistemic practices of the sixteenth century, such as the art of memory 
and encyclopaedism, and in this regard has very little in common with what modern scholars would 
now call ‘museums’.79 Stephanie Jane Bowry makes a similar argument, insisting that ‘museum’ 
is a misnomer for the type of collection that Quiccheberg envisioned: his “cabinet was the material 
expression of human knowledge in all its variety, a collection of ways of seeing as much as objects 
to see.”80 Meadow also argues that Quiccheberg’s reputation as a museum expert is misleading in 
that it deemphasizes his text’s practical and technical nature, as well as the fact that his proposed 
collection was innovative precisely because of the interactive demands it placed on users.81  
Just as Quiccheberg’s ideal Kunst- and Wunderkammer was far from a museum, 
Inscriptiones is not a “theoretical disquisition on an established cultural institution.”82 Quiccheberg 
says as much when he mentions his plans to eventually write a more scholarly work on the 
philosophy of collecting (unfortunately, he died before he could achieve this goal).83 Although 
Inscriptiones is no more a theoretical discourse on media than it is a museological tract, I argue 
that it offers an important source for thinking about the conditions of mediality in the Renaissance 
period and, furthermore, that its practical bent makes it especially useful for trying to understand 
the methods of classification and strategies of display that have made the Wunderkammer appear 
so puzzling to modernist historians and so wonderful to new media scholars and practitioners.  
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I read Inscriptiones as a critique of the Wunderkammer’s historiography in an effort to 
challenge its traditional characterization as a misguided method of classifying and representing 
knowledge, and to reflect on its relationship to contemporary digital media. I insert Quiccheberg 
as an interlocutor in the historical and contemporary literatures on the Wunderkammer in order to 
clarify his specific understanding of it and, in doing so, to point out historical discontinuities within 
this emergent media history. I take a deliberately generous approach to Quiccheberg—in part 
because the collections he was proposing have been habitually maligned and marginalized post 
mortem and are thus in need of a charitable and attentive remediator, but also because he occupied 
a privileged insider position in the European culture of collecting during the latter half of the 
sixteenth century. Quiccheberg’s expertise on late Renaissance chambers of arts and wonders far 









Quiccheberg’s Universal Theater: Structuring Knowledge 
 
Media studies has long been a safe-haven for polymaths who refuse to obey disciplinary 
boundaries: Lewis Mumford, Marshall McLuhan, Harold Innis, Friedrich Kittler, and John 
Durham Peters are all good examples. These theorists set ambitious programs for media studies 
by claiming the entire library as its source. All disciplines are relevant to the study of media: not 
just history, literature, philosophy, politics, and theology, but also physics, archaeology, biology, 
economics, and geology, to name just a few. “To study media, you cannot just study media.”84 
Quiccheberg, however, was an even more ambitious polymath. For him, knowledge of any kind 
was only attainable in medias res. The scholar quite literally needed to surround himself with 
things—ideally, all things, at least in “small compass.”85 Of course, one would need a well-stocked 
and systematically arranged library containing books written in multiple languages, with sections 
on theology, law, medicine, history, philosophy (dialectical and magical), mathematical 
(astrological, arithmetic, and geometric), literature, poetry (sacred and profane), music, grammar, 
and any other miscellaneous writings on other things, such as military operations or agriculture.86 
But this library forms only a small part of the Quicchebergian scholar’s arsenal, as books make up 
only a miniscule portion of the things in the universe. Quiccheberg thus proposed a new kind of 
collection that would assemble in one place “all those topics…that universal nature embraces, that 
all books teach, that all of human life can offer” such that “no disciplines can be taught, no work 
of art examined, so state of life imagined, that does not have its foundations, equipment, means of 
support, or examples here in the theater.”87 Hence his bold claim that his proposed collection was 
in fact a “Universal Theater.”88  
As I alluded to in the previous chapter, Quiccheberg had to adapt the innovative form of 
collection he was proposing to existing scholarly writing conventions in order to be understood by 
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his intended audience of erudite Latin-reading princes, scholars, merchants, artists, and others. 
Throughout the text, Quiccheberg most frequently refers to his proposed collection as a ‘theater’—
a term that was commonly used in book titles of the period to refer to a work concerned with the 
organization of knowledge. According to Giovanni Mazzaferro, Quiccheberg’s use of ‘theater’ is 
likely a reference to—and a subversive reappropriation of—the term as it was used in Giulio 
Delminio Camillo’s L’Idea del Theatro (The Idea of the Theater), which was published fifteen 
years prior to Inscriptiones and was far more successful. Mazzaferro explains that although both 
authors were concerned with the organization of knowledge, Camillo “conceives knowledge in 
terms of ‘memory’” while for Quiccheberg knowledge is dependent on sensory experience.89 
Similarly, Meadow argues that Quiccheberg uses ‘theater’ in a concrete (literally) sense to refer to 
“particular architectural forms that facilitate viewing”90 which he contrasts with Camillo’s 
metaphorical use of ‘theater’ to refer to philosophical and, more specifically, hermetic knowledge. 
Kate Robinson corroborates these interpretations, arguing that Camillo’s theater was 
“fundamentally a structure of conceptual relationships rather than a building of wood or stone”; 
Camillo was creating a “symbolic system” based on astronomy, myth, and classical philosophy, 
which, “by reducing knowledge to its constituent parts” could “represent both the essence of 
material and the relationships between the essences that allowed the universe to maintain its 
being.”91 However, Quiccheberg’s literal use of ‘theater’ should not be interpreted as evidence of 
his disinterest in the conceptual structure of knowledge. Rather, Camillo and Quiccheberg’s most 
significant point of divergence was their different understandings of the structure of knowledge.  
Paula Findlen explains, “In 16th and early 17th-century Europe, the idea of structuring 
knowledge was more than just a metaphor. It expressed a literal desire to give the world of ideas a 
concrete physical context, often based on idealized structures that, at first glance, seemed to have 
very little to do with the actual content of learning.”92 The close association between the physical 
structure of knowledge and its conceptual organization is hinted at in the shared etymology of 
‘theater’ and ‘theory’, both of which derive from the Greek thea meaning ‘a view’ and are closely 
related to the Greek theoria, which refers to “an intellectual activity that is neither practical nor 
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productive nor political” and translates literally to “witnessing a spectacle.”93 Indeed, the objective 
of Camillo’s textual theater was to “turn scholars into spectators”94 and approximately half of 
L’idea del theatro is “made up of textual descriptions of images, though there are no diagrams or 
pictures.”95 For Camillo, the structure of knowledge was a seven-level grid system (corresponding 
to the seven planets) that was accessed through visual and linguistic means, including cognitive 
techniques like the ars memoriae. His theater was a spectacle intended to encourage the theoretical 
contemplation of the cosmos. In contrast, Quiccheberg’s universal theater—his theory or view of 
the universe—was far less based in cognitive practices and contemplation. His goal was to 
structure knowledge in a way that not only facilitated observation, but also physical interaction 
and experimentation. Quiccheberg conceived of knowledge primarily in terms of its practical 
application, most notably in statecraft (he provides a few specific suggestions for how his universal 
theater might be used by Duke Albrecht in the promotion of Bavarian state religion or as a way of 
establishing diplomatic relations with other courts).96 Quiccheberg’s subversive move—and what 
made his theater innovative in comparison to others of the period—was that he proposed to 
materialize the theater and in doing so restructure knowledge in a way that made its management 
and production inextricable from experience. 
 
Knowledge and Experience 
Quiccheberg’s emphasis on practical knowledge and Camillo’s classical conception of knowledge 
as strictly speculative reflects the contestations between (and within) scholastics and humanists 
over the nature of experience and its proper relation to knowledge, which emerged during the latter 
half of the fifteenth century and continued until the end of the seventeenth century (although neo-
Aristotelian epistemology ultimately maintained its hegemonic status throughout this period 
through the work of various scholastic philosophers, most notably, Thomas Aquinas).97 According 
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to Aristotle, concepts of universal essences of kinds of things were extracted from sensory 
experiences of individual instances of things. Sensory experiences served as a kind of auxiliary to 
universal knowledge. Mistaking sensory experiences of particulars for essential truths in 
themselves was an epistemological error, but so too was failing to take sensory experience into 
account in the discovery of knowledge. Knowledge, in this Aristotelian view, consisted in the 
abstraction of linguistic concepts from the concatenation of sensory experiences of the material 
world. Yet, as Peter Dear points out, this epistemological framework seems to involve a sleight-
of-hand by which universal truth is derived from singular experiences.98 (I would add that this 
‘trick’ also involves a denial of language and concepts as mediators, which are no less entangled 
in material existence than the products of technical skill or art in the production of knowledge.) 
One of the most well-known articulations of the humanist critique of Aristotelian 
epistemology comes from Francis Bacon, who, unlike Aristotle, “had no epistemological 
difficulties in using artificial situations, such as experimental contrivances, in generating telling 
facts.”99 In New Organon (1620), Bacon challenges Aristotelian orthodoxy and argues that 
knowledge about the general behaviours of nature could be derived from singular experiences of 
particular things in order to generate knowledge, which he conceived in terms of its practical 
applications for improving the conditions of human life.100 As Charles Taylor explains, this 
involved the reversal of Aristotelian epistemology insofar as “[w]hat was previously stigmatized 
as lower”—i.e., practical applications of knowledge—was “now exalted as the standard, and the 
previously higher”—i.e., universal concepts about the essences of things—“is convicted of 
presumption and vanity.”101 Although Bacon was wary of final causes and essential kinds, he 
nevertheless employed a sleight-of-hand-manoeuvre reminiscent of Aristotle’s insofar as he, too, 
held that general knowledge—conceived as the product of experimentation with material 
phenomena—emerged from sensory experiences of particular things. This kind of practical 
knowledge could, in Bacon’s view, be generated effectively with a collection of artifacts and 
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specimens, arranged in a way that made them easily accessible for experimentation, and—contrary 
to Aristotelian epistemology—necessitated their decontextualization from their natural or original 
settings.  
Furthermore, unlike traditional neo-Aristotelean scholars, Bacon and his contemporaries 
were also keenly interested in deviations from the usual functioning of nature—that is, they were 
interested in wonders. Wonders played a significant role in the epistemological debates of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Nature was understood as divinely ordered, but it was neither 
uniform nor governed by a set of transhistorical and universal laws. Aberrant forms “constituted a 
distinct ontological category, the preternatural, suspended between the mundane and the 
miraculous” and were thus considered integral to revealing the secrets of divine creation.102 For 
Bacon in particular, the empirical study of wonders was linked to the generation of practical 
knowledge. As Horst Bredekamp explains, “The aberrations of nature appear in this context as 
experiments which have failed, as ‘errors.’”103 These divine experiments-gone-awry could, 
however, be retried and perfected by humans. Through artistic interventions, nature—whose 
metamorphic potential was divinely subject to myriad, unpredictable permutations—could be 
controlled and guided towards its practical application. As Lorraine Daston puts it, “Nature had, 
as it were, already begun the work of art.”104 Humans were not only able but morally obligated to 
complete it. Thus, by breaching the boundary between nature and artifice, wonders revealed 
humans and God as analogous creators.  
Although Bacon is usually cited as the progenitor of this philosophical position, 
Quiccheberg’s Inscriptiones presents a similar view in his earlier call for the establishment of 
collections of wonders of art and nature which, “through their frequent viewing and handling,” 
would enable one to “acquire unbelievable practical knowledge regarding everything and a 
manifestly divine wisdom.”105 To these practical-experimental ends, Quiccheberg proposed an 
alternative structure of knowledge, as well as a vast set of material supports through which that 
structure could be revealed. Quiccheberg explains that ‘theater’ is “employed here [in 
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Inscriptiones] for a grand building that is in the form of an arc, or oval, or in the shape of an 
ambulatory…and that is constructed with high stories on four sides.”106 Quiccheberg’s preference 
for a circular building in which to display “exemplary objects and exceptional images of the entire 
world” may be attributed to the proliferation of encyclopaedic projects during the Renaissance 
period. As Findlen explains, “Quiccheberg imagined a physical space whose shape was important 
to the function of his encyclopaedia.”107 According to Ann Blair, the term ‘encyclopaedia’, as it 
was used by Renaissance authors starting in the fifteenth century, emerged “from a corruption of 
the Greek phrase ‘enkuklios paideia’ which meant general culture or common education.”108 
Humanist scholars misinterpreted the original Greek as ‘the circle of learning’ and thus employed 
the term ‘encyclopaedia’ to refer to a work concerned with the classification of the disciplines and 
their relations to one another.109 Quiccheberg recommended a rounded or oval structure as the 
most effective way to facilitate the encyclopaedic function of the proposed collection. By 
arranging material objects within the ‘circle of learning’, one could determine the 
interrelationships between individual elements of the universe based on their physical position in 
the theater. Taken together, these myriad relations constituted a view of the world. 
Drawing on Heidegger, Hooper-Greenhill argues that by assembling a model of the 
universe in a single representational space, the Wunderkammer produced an early rendering of the 
world as a view—that is, it constituted the universe as an “epistemic thing”110 that could be both 
known and influenced by human beings.111 The notion of the ‘worldview’ is usually understood 
as a distinctly modern phenomenon since it depends upon an understanding of the human subject 
as uniquely capable of knowing and controlling the world—a notion that is typically understood 
as at odds with a premodern enchanted cosmos. Although the Wunderkammer represented “a 
world that was expanded from medieval epistemic structures and thus was premodern,”112 it was 
simultaneously a worldview insofar as it existed in relation to a subject’s—or, more specifically, 
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the collector’s—gaze. In this regard, the Wunderkammer constituted a type of worldview specific 
to the Renaissance: a microcosm.  
 
Microcosm-Macrocosm 
Michel Foucault argues that the notion of the microcosm had two main functions in Renaissance 
epistemology. The microcosm functioned, first, as a guarantee that everything it contained would 
find its correspondence in a greater scale of existence—that is, the macrocosm—and second, it 
served to guarantee the limits between these scales of existence: despite the seemingly infinite 
variety of creation on the microcosmic level, the macrocosm confirmed that there was an end to 
the seemingly ceaseless series of similitudes, that the chasm between these levels was not an 
endless void.113 The emphasis during this period on discovering hidden relations between things, 
both in regards to the proliferation of encyclopaedic projects and the elevation of artistic activities, 
emerged from the microcosm-macrocosm as the overarching analogy that contained all other 
correspondences. These relations were articulated within what Foucault describes as a “web of 
resemblance”114 which constituted the dominant conditions of knowledge production during the 
sixteenth- and seventeenth centuries in Europe. All objects—plants, animals, stars, rocks, 
utensils—were characterized solely by their form since they were ultimately made of the same 
basic elements of matter (earth, air, fire, and water). As such, “an object [was] thus characterized 
by form alone” and in order to gain knowledge about a particular thing, “it was necessary to detect 
the visible signs which nature had placed on their surfaces precisely to permit man to comprehend 
their relationships.”115 As a microcosmic model of the universe, the Wunderkammer enabled the 
meticulous study of these relationships.  
Quiccheberg explains that the objects collected for his theater will “exhibit a more obvious 
ordering according to the forms of things” since “we are not dividing up for philosophers, precisely 
in line with nature itself, all natural objects; rather, we are sorting out for princes, into certain 
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uncomplicated orderings, objects that are mostly pleasant to observe.”116 Through these 
‘uncomplicated orderings’ Quiccheberg sought to study and reveal the resemblances between 
particular things in his universal theater by bringing together a variety of forms that would not be 
comparable in nature. The main advantage of his theater was that it gave the user the ability to 
arrange and rearrange objects in multiple ways so as to discern ever more formal resemblances 
between them. In this respect, Quiccheberg’s universal theater is a rich example of the Renaissance 
period’s increased range of encyclopaedic projects devised for the organization and management 
of information. However, this was ‘in-formation’ in the sense of matter that had been formed by 
the creative power of God or human skill. Each form participated in an unknown but finite number 
of relations which spanned the distance between microcosm and macrocosm and could in principle 
be determined by interpreting their surface signatures. In this regard, for Quiccheberg everything 
was always already ‘media’ insofar as each individual form was a middling substance that 
intervened between different orders of creation. However, by arranging (and re-arranging) objects 
in the Wunderkammer, their medial function could be discerned more effectively. In this regard, 
the goal of Quiccheberg’s ideal Wunderkammer was to organize and display objects in a way that 
maximized their inherent medial function. This was an extremely difficult task, however, since 
things could relate to one another in myriad ways and in multiple registers. Thus, in designing his 
ideal Wunderkammer, the epistemic problem that Quiccheberg was trying to solve hinged on the 
following question: What manner of arrangement maximally visualizes the hidden relations 
between each element in the circle of learning? The next chapter analyzes Quiccheberg’s classes 
and inscriptions in order to better understand how his classification system facilitated the 
Wunderkammer’s encyclopaedic function. In doing so, I explore the apparent contradiction in 





                                                      






CHAPTER THREE  
 
Categories and Classification in Quiccheberg’s Universal Theater 
 
 
Almost every piece of writing about the Wunderkammer includes a sample list of the objects it 
contained. Typically, these lists juxtapose the most mythical, fraudulent, and peculiar of examples 
alongside more mundane objects. Maria Zytaruk’s provides the following list of specimens and 
artifacts typical of a Wunderkammer: “alligator’s skins, chameleons, insects set in amber, corals, 
shells, medals, intaglios, South American feather word, and wampum belts; representations of 
mythical creatures (the unicorn, the basilisk).”117 Another list by Lorraine Daston describes the 
collection of Boniface Borilly as “dominated by Roman medals” but also containing “‘a head of a 
rat from the Indies,’ ‘three well-polished coconuts, garnished with ivory, serving as flasks,’ and a 
celebrated ‘cyclops.’”118 In a different text, Daston and Katharine Park describe the 17th century 
cabinet of King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden as “richly inlaid with medallions of Limoges 
enamel, beaten silver, marble, agate, lapis lazuli, and intarsia panels of multicolored woods, and 
crowned with a mound of crystals, corals, and shells surrounding a goblet fashioned from a 
Seychelles nut chased in gold and ornamented with the figures of Neptune and Thetis,” while its 
contents included “an anamorphic painting, an Italian spinet that played three tunes by an 
automatic mechanism, a pitcher made out of a nautilus shell worked with gilded silver, 
mathematical instruments, and a mummified monkey’s claw.”119 Elsewhere, Joy Kenseth provides 
a list of objects typical of sixteenth and seventeenth century Wunderkammern: “a nautilus shell or 
a ‘unicorn’s horn,’ as well as scientific apparatus, examples of exotic animals and flora from the 
New World, and graphic, pictorial, sculptural, and especially trompe-l’oeil representations of all 
kinds of meraviglie.”120 According to Paul Grinke, “everyone wanted an Egyptian mummy, a 
Mexican idol and a Greenland kayak, the ‘blue chips’ of the curieux, but such things were rare, 
and most collectors had to settle for a piece of bitumenised criminal, a late Roman inscription or 
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an Egyptian scarab.”121 Yet another enumeration of the Wunderkammer’s apparent inability to 
discern fact from fetish comes from Paula Findlen: “The alleged remains of legendary creatures—
giants, unicorns, satyrs, basilisks—took their place next to real but puzzling phenomena such as 
fossils, loadstones, and zoophytes.”122 
As the above examples suggest, these lists of the Wunderkammer’s contents highlight its 
heterogeneity, portraying it as an anti-system that deliberately defies any underlying organizational 
coherence. Describing the Wunderkammer’s heterogeneous contents, Stephen Mullaney writes, 
These are things on holiday, randomly juxtaposed and displaced from any proper 
context…Taken together, they compose a heteroclite order without hierarchy or degree, 
an order in which kings mingle with clowns, or at least the props of their respective 
stations do; in which the outworn relics of Folly and the inconsequential charms of 
Alchemy (the unicorn’s tail: neither its most nor even its most distinctive feature) hold 
court with icons of the crown.123 
 
The sample lists of Wunderkammern contents are composed in a way that semantically and 
syntactically reinforces the idea that these collections are curious precisely because they are 
nonhierarchically ordered, which is to say, disordered. These deliberately weird lists recall Bruce 
Robertson’s aforementioned criticism of contemporary curatorial and art practices that 
characterize the Wunderkammer as an unintelligible hoard.124 
In their rapid-fire rattling off of apparently unrelated things, the above lists of 
Wunderkammern contents are curiously similar to the ones composed by a wide variety of 
contemporary theorists interested in challenging the grand narrative of Western modernity as a 
process of human enlightenment through the domination of nature. For example, Ian Bogost writes 
of “[t]he unicorn and the combine harvester, the color red and methyl alcohol, quarks and 
corrugated iron, Amelia Earhart and dyspepsia” in a paratactic attempt to convey the 
nonhierarchical principles of ‘flat ontology’, the metaphysical idea that all that all objects—
whether imagined or real—have the same metaphysical status as real ones such that certain types 
of ‘being’ cannot be considered more primary or important than others.125 Elsewhere, Jane Bennett 
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takes the following list of items as inspiration for her political philosophy of vital materiality: “one 
large men’s black plastic work glove”, “one dense mat of oak pollen”, “one unblemished dead 
rat”, “one white plastic bottle cap”, and “one smooth stick of wood”.126 In the same book, Bennett 
analyzes the electrical grid as a complex assemblage of human and nonhuman actants, describing 
it as “a volatile mix of coal, sweat, electromagnetic fields, computer programs, electron streams, 
profit motives, heat, lifestyles, nuclear fuel, plastic, fantasies of mastery, static, legislation, water, 
economic theory, wire, and wood.”127 William Connolly lists “[p]henomenologists, Buddhist 
monks, corporate advertisers, cultural anthropologists, neuroscientists, TV dramatists, Catholic 
Priests, filmmakers, and evangelical preachers” as examples of people attuned to the preliminary 
nature of experience and perception.128 Each of these lists juxtaposes humans with nonhumans or 
nature with culture through the use of metonymy and synecdoche. The intended effect of such lists 
as they are employed in contemporary critical theory is to blur conventional philosophical 
categories through the syntactic gathering of apparently disconnected things.129 
The reigning prince of networks,130 Bruno Latour, might also be crowned the king of lists. 
In addition to being cited as a key influence in the list-laden works mentioned above, Latour 
himself is a serial list-maker: 
“Elections, mass demonstrations, books, miracles, viscera laid open on the altar, viscera 
laid out on the operating tables, figures, diagrams and plans, cries, monsters, exhibitions 
at the pillory.”131 
 
“mugs, jugs, rocks, swans, cats, mats.”132 
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“a vaccine, an incandescent lamp, an equation, a pollution standard, a building, a blood 
screening procedure.”133 
 
“the Pope, French bishops, Monsanto, the Fallopian tubes, and Texas fundamentalists.”134 
 
Latour and his disciples deploy these deliberately heterogeneous lists of particulars as a strategy 
for critiquing what they see as the dominant way of ‘being modern.’ Modernity, says Latour, rests 
on the ontological separation between culture and nature. The trick to being modern is to keep the 
work of multiplying heterogeneous assemblages of natural and cultural elements (a process Latour 
calls translation or mediation) completely separate from the work of extracting them into discrete 
natural or cultural products (which Latour calls ‘purification’).135 Retrospectively, the 
Wunderkammer violates the modern constitution by putting the work of mediation front and 
center: it not only places nature and culture on par with one another; it also explicitly celebrates 
hybrid creations, like the coconut flasks and gilded nautilus shells mentioned above. Weird lists 
of Wunderkammern contents thus seem to resemble Latourian litanies not simply due to their 
syntax, but also because both recognize the existence of nonhuman agencies and, in doing so, 
collapse the “artificial taxonomy splitting the world into ‘facts’ on one side and ‘values’ on the 
other: (1) rigid, inert objects of nature acting with clockwork precision, and (2) free and arbitrary 
human cultural projections ungrounded in external reality.”136  
In the Wunderkammer as in flat ontology, everything is equally real. Is it any wonder, then, 
that those who have figured the Wunderkammer as a premodern and therefore irrational method 
of classifying and representing the world have pointed to its obsession with fabulously displayed 
nature-culture hybrids as proof of its “pointless variety and studied uselessness”?137 And, as such, 
is it all that surprising that theorists critical of modern epistemological frameworks are using “the 
cabinet of curiosities as a figure for an alternative logic of qualitative inquiry”?138 The same 
appearance of disorder that once served as evidence of the Wunderkammer’s resolute failure as a 
classification system is precisely that which makes it epistemologically productive to a new 
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generation of researchers, especially those who seek to reassemble the heterogeneous networks of 
nature-culture hybrids through the deployment of a flat ontology. 
Flatness, however, is relative. ‘Flat ontology’—the metaphysical principle that everything 
is equally real—best describes an analytic stance, not a lived reality. What looks like a flat ontology 
from one point of view often appears from another to be rather like the border between Canada 
and the United States, which on a representational map appears as a straight line, but in close 
proximity is noticeably rugged, lumpy, and undefined in some places. As Peters points out, a 
potentially harmful effect of these category-confounding lists is that by portraying heterogeneous 
things as if they all exist on horizontal plane, “the sometimes brutally hierarchical and unequal 
character of things disappears from view.”139 
In the Wunderkammer as in flat ontology, everything is equally real; but not everything is 
equally represented. What looks to us like a wonderful display of heterogeneity or even ontological 
pluralism was viewed (literally) as a microcosmic representation of the entire cosmos for 
Renaissance collectors like Quiccheberg. In this chapter, I take a closer look at Quiccheberg’s 
classes and inscriptions in order to demonstrate that his ideal Wunderkammer was far from 
disordered; it was designed according to a systematic conception of knowledge in which 
heterogeneity served a specific epistemic function. Based on my analysis of Quiccheberg’s 
classification system for an ideal Wunderkammer, I argue that what appears to modern eyes as a 
heterogeneous display of irreducible difference was for Quiccheberg a universal view—“a stand-
in for the globe in its entirety.”140  
 
The Classes 
The first section of Quiccheberg’s Inscriptiones provides an overview of a classification system 
for potential Wunderkammern which serves simultaneously as a method of display. The system is 
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divided into five classes, each of which contains ten or eleven inscriptions or sub-categories, for a 
total of fifty-three individual inscriptions. Many inscriptions are marked by the astronomical sign 
of Mercury which indicates that Quiccheberg will elaborate on these particular inscriptions in a 
subsequent section titled “Digressions and Clarifications” so as to avoid going into too much detail 
in the initial overview of his system.141 Quiccheberg uses the term ‘inscriptions’ in order to suggest 
that collectors might, at their discretion, include small placards throughout their Wunderkammern 
to indicate the locations of specific ‘museums’ or sub-collections.142 Quiccheberg’s classes and 
inscriptions cover the collectability of the entire universe such that any Wunderkammern 
established on the basis of this system would enable one to gain practical knowledge about any 
topic. Quiccheberg explains, 
it has been necessary here to describe everything in full so that at least in the general 
enumeration there is nothing left to be desired. And hence these matters are placed at the 
center of our discussion; not because I think that the lifetime of any man, even the most 
wealthy and diligent, is sufficient for collecting everything that could be broadly gathered 
into these classes but because I wanted, with this most complete and universal 
enumeration, to add these things to the considerations of men just as Cicero did with 
regard to the complete orator. Thus, on the basis of these classes, they might measure the 
magnitude of their knowledge of all things, and they might be stimulated to imagine and 
investigate other matters in turn.143 
 
The reference to Cicero suggests that Quiccheberg envisioned the ideal Wunderkammer as an 
improved version of classical knowledge structures.144 Cicero’s ‘complete orator’ had to possess 
an encyclopaedic knowledge of the universe so as to be able to deliver a speech or engage in a 
debate about any topic. This encyclopaedic knowledge also enabled the orator to develop and 
organize his or her arguments according to the disciplines of knowledge most appropriate to the 
subject matter. As Kuwakino argues, Quiccheberg understood the Wunderkammer as “the perfect 
instrument to attain this objective [because] by studying its collections the visitor could acquire 
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knowledge superior to that possessed by the Ciceronian orator in every field.”145 What made the 
Wunderkammer superior, in Quiccheberg’s view, was its accumulation of material artifacts and 
their display in a single, physical space (or series of interconnected spaces), since first-hand 
experience of particular things of the universe was—in stark contrast to classical authors like 
Cicero and Aristotle—a necessary condition of genuine knowledge. 
The first of the five classes is concerned with the founder of the theater, his genealogy, and 
his relationship to God. The inscriptions within this first class begin with artfully crafted depictions 
of Christian history and are given primacy so that “the gods favor the entrance to the theater or 
collection.”146 These are followed immediately by family trees; portraits of the founder and his 
family and predecessors; maps and other geographical representations of the founder’s territory; 
depictions of important cities, both European and non-European; representations of military 
history, such as famous battles or wars; images of festivals, games, or other events that celebrate 
the nation and its rulers; paintings of “memorable” or “rarely depicted” animals, especially those 
that are indigenous to the founder’s region; architectural models; and, finally, small models of 
machines that might inspire future innovation. 
The second class is dedicated to objects that have been produced through some sort of 
technical skill or craft. It includes ancient and modern statues of important figures (e.g. gods and 
kings) and animals made from a variety of materials, such as wood, bronze, stone, and clay; 
artisanal works made from metals (e.g. clocks, swords); artisanal works made from other materials 
(e.g. wood, glass, fabrics); crafted objects of different geographical or historical origins, which 
might contribute to an understanding of non-European or ancient craftsmanship; non-European 
and ancient containers made of various materials; instruments of measurement; coins made of 
bronze, silver, or gold from both European and non-European countries, and produced in  both 
contemporary and ancient periods; portraits resembling coins; objects made from the same 
material as coins, but with allegorical or symbolic content; tiny and decorative ornaments; and 
copper engravings of images relevant to the theater. 
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The third class encompasses objects pertaining to nature and natural history. The 
inscriptions begin with ‘marvelous and very rare’ animals and insects (whole specimens and 
fragments) that have been preserved so as not to decay, followed immediately by casts of animals 
made from various materials. Other categories include animal parts, such as skin, teeth, feathers, 
organs, and bones; full or partial skeletons of animals, including humans; plant specimens; raw 
metals; gemstones and minerals; pigments for colouring or painting various materials; and natural 
pigments and materials derived from the earth. 
The fourth class contains instruments, tools, and equipment used in the liberal arts and 
sciences, as well as by merchants and artisans. The items found here include musical instruments; 
mathematical instruments; writing and painting equipment; transportation instruments; the tools 
of sculptors, goldsmiths, woodworkers, and other craftsmen; surgical and cosmetic tools; hunting 
equipment; recreational equipment for exercise or games; foreign weapons; foreign clothing and 
equipment for making clothing; and clothing of significance to the founder of the theater, such as 
military or priestly garments. 
The fifth and final class, much like the first, primarily contains two-dimensional images 
and representations such as paintings, engravings, catalogues, genealogies, portraits, and 
tapestries. Unlike the first class, though, the fifth is less concerned with linking the theater’s 
founder to the divine. Instead, here is where Quiccheberg allowed for the founder to express his 
personal interests and (political) agenda more freely, through the inclusion of representational 
objects, such as portraits of the founder’s associates or mentors, or aphorisms selected by the 
founder, which were to be inscribed on various materials and displayed on the walls of the theater. 
The last sub-category in this class is dedicated to containers of various kinds, such as “caskets, 
chests, letter cases, cabinets, woven baskets, platforms that have steps, trays and chests.”147 
Although containers can be categorized elsewhere in the collection as methods of storage and 
display, in this class the containers themselves are objects worthy of study and display. This final 
class is explicitly recursive insofar as it contains items produced by the objects in the other classes. 
In this regard, it might be described as a ‘meta-class’ insofar as it represents the collection as a 
whole, while also referring to a specific class of objects (i.e. representations of knowledge). 
                                                      






At first glance, the classes and inscriptions appear hierarchically ordered: they begin with 
God, the ruler and his kingdom, followed by artistic or creative products, natural objects, then the 
tools and instruments used to study, control, and manipulate nature, and culminate in 
representations of knowledge effected by those tools. Read sequentially, the arrangement of the 
classes in this order implies a causal chain whereby God, making humankind in his image, imbues 
human beings with the ability to manipulate and control the natural world, and thus enables them 
to acquire divine wisdom. However, the causal chain implied by the particular order of the classes 
as they are presented in Quiccheberg’s text is largely an effect of the linearity of writing.148 
According to Meadow, the five classes in fact operate as “a linked cycle.”149 Any of the classes 
may be placed at the start of the cycle, resulting in an alternative configuration that reveals a 
different set of links among the classes and thus produces a different causal chain. The classes are 
thus reflexive in that each one serves simultaneously as cause and effect of the others. 
Meadow demonstrates the reflexivity of Quiccheberg’s classes through a thought 
experiment in which he places each class at the beginning of the cycle in order to discern the causal 
chain of different configurations. For example, if the third class (naturalia) is placed in the 
governing position, then it follows that the world of nature is the foundation from which 
instrumentation (class 4) produces artifacts (class 2), which serve the higher purpose of 
contributing to knowledge through its representation in various media (class 5) which can be made 
useful by the founder through his relation to God (class 1). Alternatively, if representations of 
knowledge are placed in the governing position, the founder of the collection “becomes the 
generator of wisdom through his judicious use of the appropriate instruments” and the “realms of 
naturalia and artificialia serve as the bases from which the [founder] derives his knowledge.”150 
As these examples illustrate, Quiccheberg’s classes are deliberately reflexive so as to enable 
various possible physical configurations through which the interrelationships between them can 
be discerned. Furthermore, because the ideal structure in which these classes would facilitate the 
organization of a collection is a circular theater, multiple of these configurations could in theory 
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be visible simultaneously. The classes, in other words, do not restrict the collection to a single, 
linear order. Rather, their reflexivity enables multiple dynamic orders to operate simultaneously. 
Given the range of possible orders in which the five classes might be arranged, it is tempting to 
describe Quiccheberg’s system as a heterarchy. Carole L. Crumley defines ‘heterarchy’ as “the 
relation of elements to one another when they are unranked or when they possess the potential for 
being ranked in a number of different ways.”151 The term ‘heterarchy’ was coined by Warren S. 
McCulloch in a 1945 article submitted to the Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics in which he 
explores how neurological networks are subject to multiple competing and nonlinear interpretive 
regimes and are thus far richer than purely hierarchical systems. McCulloch contrasts heterarchy 
with hierarchy, using the “sacerdotal structure of the church” as an example of the latter. In 
hierarchy “the order is such that there is some end preferred to all others” and therefore “to assert 
a hierarchy of values is to assert that values are magnitudes of some one kind.”152 Although 
hierarchy and heterarchy are often positioned as opposites, they are in fact complementary 
structures: a heterarchy may contain multiple hierarchies and those hierarchies may be ranked in 
multiple ways.153 Using a network of six neurons as an example, McCulloch explains that in 
heterarchy 
circularities in preference instead of indicating inconsistencies, actually demonstrate 
consistency of a higher order than had been dreamed of in our philosophy. An organism 
possessed of this nervous system—six neurons—is sufficiently endowed to be 
unpredictable from any theory founded on a scale of values. It has a heterarchy of values, 
and is thus internectively too rich to submit to a summum bonum.154 
 
The notion of heterarchy is useful for describing reflexive systems that resist linear logics and 
therefore do not submit to a single evaluative framework. In this respect, all views of a 
heterarchical system are partial: a complete view of the system is impossible. This feature of 
heterarchy makes it especially useful in devising strategies for challenging hegemonic structures, 
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especially traditional hierarchies, from within the system itself.155 Zizi Papacharissi, for example, 
applies the notion of heterarchy to digital platforms. She argues that as algorithms increasingly 
limit agency and impose particular pathways of attention in online environments, it becomes 
critically important for social actors to seek out ‘leverage points’—i.e. moments in which these 
pathways and structures can be transformed—in the system in order to reassert their agency. These 
leverage points are characterized by “social heterarchy” in that they “render[] all actors equal, for 
the time being”156 and potentially enable actors to reassemble into structures with more diverse 
and autonomous pathways of attention. Heterarchy, in contemporary thought, is thus linked to 
social transformation and political resistance. 
Quiccheberg’s system resembles a heterarchy in terms of its reflexive classes, which can 
be ranked in multiple ways, as well as in regards to its inherent partiality. As discussed in chapter 
five, the Wunderkammer is a microcosm, a view of the world in miniature, but this view is 
necessarily constituted from the position of the gazing subject. If considered as a heterarchical 
system, the position of the gazing subject might translate to the ‘leverage point’ from which new 
pathways and structures within the Wunderkammer can be revealed. However, in this case, 
leverage points do not have a subversive function. Rather, by identifying new pathways between 
and amongst the classes, the human viewer in the Wunderkammer reasserts the power of God as 
divine creator of this vast network of resemblances that constitutes the microcosm-macrocosm.  
Quiccheberg’s system seems heterarchical in that it does not submit to a single evaluative 
framework or allow a complete view of the whole system; however, in contrast to McCulloch’s 
neural network, this is precisely because it submits to a summum bonum. Although a totalizing 
view was not humanly possible, it was nevertheless the case that in the network of hidden relations 
made visible by the Wunderkammer, one view is more ‘complete’ than others—that is, the view 
of the Creator, God. Thus, in principle, Quiccheberg’s classes did in fact submit to a summum 
bonum; however, this was a ‘highest good’ conceived as beyond complete human comprehension, 
yet not entirely out of grasp. There are clues—what Foucault calls ‘signatures’—hidden in the 
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forms of particular things which enable human beings to decipher the complex system of 
correspondences that constitute the universe.157 But each individual thing has multiple signatures 
embedded into its form. Indeed, the content of a particular surface signature is yet another 
resemblance to be deciphered within the web of overlapping correspondences.158 As such, the 
system that organized a universal collection could not be limited to a single interpretive register or 
evaluative framework, since doing so would ossify one particular set of relations, while 
obfuscating others. It thus had to allow for heterogeneity—of material objects, their values, and 
the interpretive registers in which these values could be ascertained—not in order to transform, 
resist, or subvert a totalizing view but precisely because heterogeneity simultaneously affirmed 
and delimited that totalization. 
Whether Quiccheberg’s system is distinct from a heterarchy or a particular species of 
heterarchy not accounted for in McCulloch’s definition is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the 
notion of heterarchy is helpful in illustrating that the highly reflexive classes of Quiccheberg’s 
system does not make it anti-systematic or disorderly, but actually suggests that his ideal 
Wunderkammer was organized by a complex, multi-layered system that exceeds traditional 
understandings of systematicity. In the next section of this chapter, I examine some of the specific 
inscriptions of Quiccheberg’s classes in more detail in order to illustrate how the reflexivity of his 






Each of the five classes in Quiccheberg’s system contains ten or eleven individual inscriptions 
which delineate a variety of items potential collectors might display together. Each of 
Quiccheberg’s inscriptions—which are numbered, but not named—describes a variety of possible 
objects that could be displayed together in the Wunderkammer. The inextricability of place and 
knowledge in Renaissance epistemology is highlighted once again by Quiccheberg’s inscriptions: 
the physical arrangement of objects denotes their conceptual relationships to one another. Like the 
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classes to which they belong, the inscriptions are not rigidly ordered, nor are they mutually 
exclusive. Quiccheberg recommends that the inscriptions for a universal theater should “be most 
broadly accessible” such that objects could be “most extensively distributed into these 
divisions.”159 The flexibility of the inscriptions enables seemingly disparate and heterogeneous 
things to be grouped together. Grouping things together according to their formal similarities was, 
in Quiccheberg’s view, an effective strategy for making parts of the invisible network of relations 
become visible because physical proximity constitutes a real conceptual relationship and thus can 
be used to generate practical knowledge. 
For example, inscription 3.4 recommends the display of “diverse skeletons or connected 
bones” as well as “things artfully made into the shape of human parts…and provided recently to 
serve [as prostheses for] people who have been mutilated.”160 To Quiccheberg—a trained 
physician—the observation and study of skeletal fragments alongside things that looked like 
human body parts could help inspire innovative solutions to human suffering. But the way in which 
one learned of such practical knowledge was through the particular forms that God had imparted 
onto matter: things that looked like human body parts looked that way because they were supposed 
to be used as prosthetics. Due to the practical-experimental nature of Quiccheberg’s ideal 
Wunderkammer, the inscriptions are often based on the practical or experiential qualities of 
objects. Inscription 3.10, for example, groups together objects that are “spreadable” and “friable” 
such as paints and pigments, or other substances that can be used for staining or colouring other 
materials like “metals, gum, wax, sulfur, wood, ivory, woven fabrics, or wool.”161 Similarly, 
inscription 2.2 for objects made from various kinds of metals, or inscription 3.8 which contains 
gemstones and other “shining materials.”162 Inscription 4.7 is dedicated to “whatever is necessary 
for rural life and for gardening.”163 A final example is inscription 2.6 for “everything related to 
geodesy”, i.e., objects used for measuring the earth. 
Throughout his enumeration of the inscriptions, Quiccheberg’s recommendations for 
collectible objects oscillate between broadly inclusive and incredibly specific. For example, 
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inscription 1.8 Quiccheberg specifically suggests the inclusion of “grand paintings of animals that 
are more rarely depicted, such as deer, boars, lions, bears, beavers, and fish (both fresh- and 
seawater varieties)” as well as “any memorable animals that the founder’s native region fosters 
beyond common practice, or else those it happens to lack.”164 This oscillation between specific 
examples and an ‘anything goes’ attitude is also illustrated by inscription 4.9, dedicated to weapons 
from foreign nations in which Quiccheberg suggests the specific examples of “scimitars, bows, 
ballistas, spears, quivers, and slings” but also “whatever else is so rare that it seems fit for making 
a collection admirable as for equipping an arsenal.”165 
Quiccheberg’s recommendations for collectibles suggest that the specific contents of the 
universal theater are less important than the act of grouping, displaying, and studying particular 
objects. Perhaps he thought that his readers would be more likely to develop their own 
Wunderkammern if it seemed relatively feasible and practical. Like the classes to which they 
belong, the inscriptions for Quiccheberg’s universal theater are overlapping and can be physically 
arranged into multiple configurations. Objects could be categorized under multiple inscriptions, 
depending on whichever formal feature the collector wanted to highlight. This is especially clear 
in class five which, as previously mentioned, operates as a sort of meta-class as it recapitulates the 
other classes. Inscriptions 5.1 and 5.2 are for oil and watercolour paintings, respectively, but 
paintings may also be categorized under inscriptions 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8. In the fifth 
class, the criterion of inclusion is the medium in which the paintings were produced; in the first 
class, it is the content of the paintings (e.g. portraits of the founder, rare animals, or depictions of 
important cities) that justifies their inclusion in the appropriate categories. 
The inclusive and overlapping categories of Quiccheberg’s system would not only facilitate 
conceptual flexibility but would also enable collectors to make economical use of the space 
available for their Wunderkammern. As Meadow observes, Quiccheberg’s system was designed 
with practical issues of storage and display in mind: 
Quiccheberg’s rationale for restricting paintings of animals to class 1, inscription 8 solely 
concerns practicalities of display; they require large expanses on walls and therefore are 
better hung with other large paintings. The implication is that the paintings of animals 
(and by extension, depictions of nature elsewhere in the collection) could simultaneously 
serve as supplements to the natural specimens of class 3, which is a good illustration of 
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their multiple functions and values within Quiccheberg’s system. An oil painting of an 
animal…could stand as an example of the artist’s skill; as an end product made of oils, 
earths, and pigments; and as an informative image of a live creature in its native 
habitat.166 
 
Similarly, the medical instruments of inscription 4.6 could serve as examples of the material from 
which they were made, products of creative or technical skill, or as instruments for the 
manipulation of other artifacts and specimens, depending on how they were displayed. These 
examples illustrate how the conceptual scheme of Quiccheberg’s universal theater both reinforces 
and is reinforced by the more material and mundane matters of storage and display. 
Quiccheberg takes great care to describe the practical aspects of assembling a 
Wunderkammer, often in painstaking detail. He provides some guidance on this subject in the 
initial enumeration of the individual inscriptions, such as inscription 4.3, which is dedicated to 
writing and painting instruments and should be “arranged in their own cases.”167 For inscription 
5.10, concerning containers, Quiccheberg describes how tables might be placed throughout the 
theater and “covered chests” might be arranged against the walls.168 The bulk of Quiccheberg’s 
instructions regarding storage and display are found in the sections titled “Recommendations and 
Advice” and “Digressions and Clarifications” which follow the initial overview of the classes and 
inscriptions and go into considerably more detail about his proposed system, particularly those 
inscriptions that have been marked with the sign of Mercury.169 After emphasizing that not all 
collections will be able to cover all of the inscriptions included in his system, Quiccheberg offers 
the following advice on how to make use of even a modest space: 
It is inconsequential that there should be no place, whether broad or narrow, for these 
things to be kept on display; for many can be stored, either wrapped or folder up, in 
narrow coffers, cabinets, or boxes, since even if they were to be displayed on walls and 
laid out on enormous tables or small, tiered tables, they would hardly have enough space. 
But here I ought to mention that apart from those caskets, woven baskets, built-in 
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cabinets, tables, and tiered stands, still other containers can serve this same function—
particularly moveable shelves with grooves (which will be properly named). Likewise, 
there are little portable containers with sub-dividers; then caskets with doors and also 
caskets with doors folding outward; and finally containers in the shape of turrets, which 
are of superior artistry and immeasurable practical value.170 
 
Elsewhere, he describes how collectors might store seeds, fruits, and stones in small jewellery 
boxes; how to use cases and chests for storing instruments; how large books might be unbound so 
as to display their pages on walls or in filing cabinets with other 2-dimensional images; and how 
ornamental objects will require several small cases so that they can be further sorted according to 
specific sub-categories, such as ‘leafy’, ‘grotesque’, ‘composite’, and ‘monstrous.’171 
Throughout all fifty-three inscriptions, Quiccheberg consistently emphasizes the 
importance of showcasing a variety of specimens and artifacts. Depending on whether a particular 
inscription is based on shape, colour, size, material, age, place or time of origin, subject (e.g., the 
particular image engraved on a coin or the subject of a painting), or texture, each includes 
variations among these qualities in a single category. The ‘spreadable’ substances of 3.10 
(mentioned above) or the vessels “differing widely in shape” of 2.5 are good examples of this 
variety within a single category. Although ‘categories’ are today usually understood as scientific 
and taxonomic tools for dividing and arranging things according to essential kinds or types, 
Quiccheberg’s inscriptions suggest an alternative conception of the ‘category’. Bowry avers that 
the ‘category’ in Quiccheberg’s system is “not so much a neatly-defined statement of fact as 
merely a proposition or an argument for a frame of reference.”172 In this vein, Bowry postulates 
that Quiccheberg’s conception of categories derives from Aristotelean logic in which kategoria 
were used to determine the natures of things, yet did so from a variety of perspectives by exploring 
the sensory qualities of objects—that is, in Bowry’s words, “by comparing and contrasting not 
only different types of object, but different types of predicate: the sharpness of a knife might be 
contrasted with the sharpness of a sound.”173 Quiccheberg’s inscriptions work in a similar way, 
contrasting the roundness of coins with the roundness of medallions as in inscriptions 2.7 and 2.8, 
or the beaks, teeth, horns and “whatever of the remaining parts can add some measure of variety” 
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of different animals in inscription 3.3. Kuwakino makes a similar argument regarding 
Quiccheberg’s conception of categories in relation to Ciceronian oratory. Applying rhetorical 
techniques to the practice of collecting, Quiccheberg approached “the classification of objects 
based on the criteria of ‘similarity, difference, and opposition.’”174 Whereas Cicero’s complete 
orator used categories as conceptual tools to describe the multiple registers in which one might 
talk about a particular thing or topic in public (as Latour points out, there is an etymological 
association between agora and kategoria),175 Quiccheberg’s collector materialized categories with 
physical objects in order to reconstitute the variety of the universe. 
A significant effect of Quiccheberg’s use of categories, as well as the reflexive classes to 
which they belong, is that his ideal Wunderkammer would be full of stark contrasts, weird 
juxtapositions, and unpredictable affinities and thus might quite understandably appear to modern 
eyes as a deliberately heterogeneous assemblage of natural and cultural elements. Indeed, 
Quiccheberg’s ordering system not only allowed but encouraged the side-by-side display of, for 
example, classical Roman sculptures with contemporary (16th-century) machines, natural 
specimens with human-made creations, and European artifacts with foreign ethnographica in ways 
that violated the Aristotelian conceptual reflex which demanded the separation of divine nature 
from the lowly realm of art in order to guarantee that speculative contemplation would not be 
contaminated by practical application. Quiccheberg’s insistence upon the intermingling of 
artificialia and naturalia was indeed a heterodox stance but for reasons utterly distinct from 20th- 
and 21st-century theorists’ attempts to abolish the nature-culture opposition in the name of 
symmetrical anthropology or flat ontology. Quiccheberg elevated art alongside nature in order to 
highlight the resemblances between humans and God as creative makers. The aim was not to 
eradicate the Aristotelian division between nature and art; it was to comprehend the relations 
between forms more precisely.176 In contrast, today’s Latourian scholars rethink ‘purely’ social 
explanations of phenomena by trying to repopulate humanistic and social scientific inquiry with 
all of the nonhuman actors that have been ritually neglected and abused by the modern 
constitution’s radical anthropocentrism. Although each of these attempts to rethink the relationship 
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between nature and culture hinges on the notion of heterogeneity, the concept of ‘heterogeneity’ 
has a history as full of discontinuities as ‘media’.  
 
Heterogeneity and Universality 
 
When Quiccheberg published Inscriptiones in 1565, ‘heterogeneity’ was not conceived in terms 
of difference or pluralism. As Kevin Hetherington explains, “the Renaissance outlook does not 
have a strong sense of the heterogeneous as something different, disordered or Other.”177  The 
diversity of forms on display in the Wunderkammer was a demonstration of the creative power of 
humans and God to impart form onto matter in analogous ways. Heterogeneity was thus an 
indication of the sameness of matter across all of the unique forms of particular things. 
This alternative sense of heterogeneity is illustrated by the example of Quiccheberg’s 
recommendations for the classification of non-European materials. A number of inscriptions 
include both European and non-European materials together in the same category. Inscription 1.5, 
for instance, recommends the display of “depictions of cities…both Christian and those cities that 
are distinguished in regions outside the Christian world.”178 In the second class, dedicated to 
artistic products, Quiccheberg dedicates the fourth inscription to “ingenious objects worthy of 
admiration either owing to their rarity or to the distance of space or time from their point of origin.” 
The inclusion of non-European objects in this inscription was supposed “to lead us to an 
understanding of foreign customs and craftsmanship” by enabling the identification of their 
resemblances to European objects. A final example of the juxtaposition of European and non-
European objects in a single inscription is 3.5 for plant specimens (e.g. seeds, fruits, roots) in which 
“foreign, marvelous, or fragrant ones receive preference.”179 Since aberrant and rare forms were 
prized above all, owing to the assumption that wonders held the secrets to the divine order of 
nature, foreign naturalia were especially of interest to Quiccheberg for their formal distinctions 
from specimens with which Europeans were familiar. Other inscriptions are dedicated exclusively 
to non-European materials. For example, inscription 2.4 is for various “foreign vessels” which 
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have been “excavated from ancient ruins, some brought from afar or merely less used in the region 
of the theater’s founder.”180 Inscriptions 4.9 and 4.10 are also dedicated respectively to non-
European weapons and clothing. In each of these inscriptions, Quiccheberg explains that the 
objects of these classes are prized for their variation from their European counterparts. In 
Quiccheberg’s ideal Wunderkammer, European materials could be juxtaposed with non-European 
ones either in a single inscription based on a shared formal characteristic or through the 
arrangement of the classes into different configurations. 
Furthermore, the juxtaposition of European and non-European materials described in 
Inscriptiones was common practice in actual Wunderkammern of the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries. In her analysis of inventories of the Wunderkammer of Duke Cosimo I (who 
reigned from 1537 to 1574) in Tuscany, Adriana Turpin recounts the initial classification and 
subsequent reclassifications of a group of Aztec masks. Initially the masks, made of wood and 
covered in turquoise, were classified as jewellery and served as examples of the materials from 
which they were made and as products of skillful manufacture. They were grouped in a category 
for miscellaneous objects alongside both artificialia (including “various textiles”, “a globe”, and 
“small items of ebony and jasper”) and naturalia (such as “seven small heads of animals”, “a 
crocodile”, and “four elephant’s teeth).”181 A later inventory shows that the Aztec masks were 
repositioned alongside European-made masks and reclassified as “costumes for masques”, a 
category dedicated to the instrumentation of the theatrical arts.182 Turpin argues that the multiple 
reclassifications of this group of masks within the collection indicate the gradual assimilation of 
exotica within European epistemological frameworks: the Aztec masks were reclassified and 
repositioned as their forms increasingly came to be viewed as similar to those of European artifacts. 
Elke Bujok reaches a similar conclusion in her study of the incorporation of foreign ethnographic 
items in early modern Kunstkammern. Collectors were not interested in the ethnographic details, 
cultural significance, or intended purpose of non-European or European objects. Like their 
domestic counterparts, foreign objects acquired from overseas exploration and imperial conquests 
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“were seen as revealing the ingenuity and diversity of divine creation.”183 The acquisition and 
display of non-European objects in the Wunderkammer was an effective way of increasing the 
heterogeneity—and thus the universality—of the collection because they provided a whole new 
range of unique forms with which to study resemblances. 
In the classification of objects in the Wunderkammer, non-European objects were in 
general treated no differently from European ones. But this should not be interpreted in terms of a 
pluralist ontology or even as an indication of cultural tolerance. Renaissance collectors like 
Quiccheberg conceived of heterogeneity as a testament to the variety of forms that nature could 
take according to a European—and specifically Christian—epistemological framework, rather 
than as material evidence of cultural practices radically distinct from their own. By the time a 
particular object made it into a Wunderkammer, it had already been subsumed within this Euro-
Christian framework. The incorporation of non-European objects into Quiccheberg’s ideal 
Wunderkammer—and in some actual collections—is not an indication of equality or a recognition 
of difference but the result of their incorporation into the networks of imperial exploration and 
trade through which wonderful and marvelous objects were extracted by collectors because they 
met European criteria of selection, whether economic, aesthetic, epistemic, or otherwise. 
Quiccheberg’s justification for the inclusion of non-European artifacts and specimens 
might also have been influenced by the revival of classical sources throughout the Renaissance. 
His system of classification was in part based on Pliny’s Natural History (written between 77-79 
C.E.), which served as a major influence for those interested in encyclopaedism—conceived as the 
‘circle of learning’—during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.184 According to Ann Blair, 
Pliny is credited with the coinage of a popular expression among encyclopaedia enthusiasts: “no 
book so bad.”185 Pliny recognized that all books—and the disciplines to which they belonged—
had value regardless of origin or content and advised that even if a book’s value was not 
immediately recognizable, it might become apparent at a different point in history. Blair argues 
that Pliny’s idiom was often conflated with “the natural theological principle that apparently bad 
or useless species in nature served a higher purpose.”186 These principles served as justification 
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for the inclusion of ostensibly insignificant objects and inferior knowledge in encyclopaedic 
collections, since such ‘failures’ might later prove useful as inspiration for future innovations or 
as tangible examples of progress when compared with other objects. 
An example of this encyclopaedic principle of inclusivity can be found in the work of one 
of Quiccheberg’s contemporaries, Ulisse Aldrovandi, an Italian scholar and owner of one of the 
most famous Wunderkammern of the period. In Aldrovandi’s 1598 work, On Chickens, the author 
presents a thorough study of the chicken. The table of contents offers an excellent illustration of 
the variety of topics covered by Aldrovandi’s study: 
Terminology—Synonyms—Differentiae of the Genus—The Form and Description of the 
Rooster and the Hen in their Genus—Anatomical Details—Sex—Sight. Taste—Voice. 
Song—Lustfulness. Coition. Parturition. Incubation. Generation. Egg-laying—Rearing. 
Feeding—Nature. Habits. Character—Magnanimity. Fighting—Sympathy. Antipathy—
Concerning the Diseases of Chickens—The Method of Catching Chickens—History—
Synonyms—Derivatives—Presages—Use in the Sacred Rites of the Pagans—Auguries. 
Prodigies—Mystical Interpretation—Moral Interpretations—Secret Signs 
(Hieroglyphics)—Dreams—Emblems—Riddles—Epitaph—Apophthegms—Proverbs—
Fable—Apologues—Use in Medicine—Injurious Effects of Chickens—Use of the 
Chicken as Food—Various Other Uses of the Chicken—Insignia. Images. Coins.187 
 
The range of topics included in Aldrovandi’s study of the chicken demonstrates the encyclopaedic 
understanding of inquiry as not limited “according to any one set of principles but as the 
interweaving of numerous diverse and philosophical systems.”188 It also offers an apt example of 
the way in which Renaissance encyclopaedism was characterized by a productive tension between 
the theoretical classification of disciplines and the practical accumulation of heterogeneous 
facts.189 Aldrovandi’s encyclopaedic study of the chicken dabbles in mythology, anatomy, sexual 
reproduction, magic, medicine, and cooking. Despite this variety, however, Renaissance 
encyclopaedists did not—as it may appear to modern readers—select a number of topics to discuss 
at random. Each domain or discipline was part of the same circle of learning and were therefore 
necessary for genuinely encyclopaedic knowledge. As Foucault explains, the Renaissance era did 
not conceive of magic and medicine, for example, as rival forms of knowledge; rather, both are 
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“part of the main body of knowledge itself.”190 In other words, the epistemological dilemma here 
was not a matter of determining which domain of knowledge rules over and against all of the 
others, but a question of how to understand the relations between each distinct form within the 
continuous body of knowledge. 
As a ‘live action’ encyclopaedia, Quiccheberg’s ideal Wunderkammer was organized in 
manner similar to Aldrovandi’s On Chickens insofar as it was to contain a variety of forms 
representative of every discipline and provide the means with which collectors could achieve 
practical knowledge of the entire universe. Heterogeneity was not conceived as difference but as 
the key to deciphering the universe. The ‘universality’ of Quiccheberg’s proposed Wunderkammer 
was also conceived differently from how we might understand it today. In Quiccheberg’s sense of 
the term, universality had nothing to do with totality or completeness, since—as discussed in the 
previous section—a complete view, in the sense of the ‘theater’ as ‘theory’, was neither possible 
(for human beings), nor desirable. As Meadow explains, “Completeness is not the goal; indeed, it 
is unattainable. Instead, the quest is to stimulate new learning and expand useful knowledge.”  191 
A universal theater was thus not a totalizing theory of the universe but instead an encyclopaedia 
that could make all of the objects it contained ‘communicate’ with one another. 192 If a 
Wunderkammer contained only a limited number of objects, so long as they were sufficiently 
diverse in form, the objects could be made to ‘speak’ to each other through their various formal 
features and to engage in multiple ‘conversations’ simultaneously. 
Categorizing objects according to their forms was thus practical in terms of making it easy 
to organize a collection, but also in terms of amplifying the use value of specific objects. The 
position of an individual object within the Wunderkammer should be the one that renders it most 
useful and the use value of any object was a measure of its level of interrelatedness with all of the 
other objects in the collection. As Bruce Robertson explains, “the interrelatedness of a collection—
the juxtaposition or grouping of objects—enhances the practical value of any single object. An 
encyclopaedic collection allows the user to extract the maximum information from the individual 
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artifact or specimen.” 193 To this end, Quiccheberg’s classes and inscriptions were not fixed 
categories, nor were they mutually exclusive. Rigidly demarcated or fixed categories based on 
essential concepts would in fact diminish the heterogeneity of the collection by reducing the 
possible relations between objects and therefore also detract from its universality. 
In sum, the built-in reflexivity of Quiccheberg’s inscriptions and classes suggests that 
classification alone was not the ultimate goal of his ideal Wunderkammer—or, more specifically, 
classification in the sense of dividing and arranging the universe into a static order based on the 
essential nature of particular things was not of concern to Quiccheberg. As Bruce Robertson 
asserts, “Quiccheberg’s inscriptions and classes serve to map out and organize the collectability of 
the material world, but they do so for a greater purpose than to taxonomize it.”194 Rather, 
classification functioned as an ongoing practical task through which objects were selected 
according to a stipulated feature—i.e. a quality or aspect of a thing that could be experienced 
through the senses—and grouped together in order to reveal their hidden relations.195 The efficacy 
of the Wunderkammer, in Quiccheberg’s view, lay precisely in that it brought together diverse 
phenomena such that relations between things that would never naturally be grouped together 
could be revealed through experience and experimentation within the artificial conditions of the 
theater, chamber, or cabinet. Quiccheberg’s classes and inscriptions served as a working system 
that facilitated the “frequent viewing and handling”196 of the objects in the collection which lead 
to the discovery of different forms of relationality. This in turn enabled a collector to “acquire 
unbelievable practical knowledge regarding everything and a manifestly divine wisdom.”197  
Although the exact etymological origins of the German word Wunder are uncertain, 
Quiccheberg’s ideal Wunderkammer lends credence to the theory that it “may have to do with 
intricacy or complexity.”198 Rather than constituting a miscellaneous anti-system, Quiccheberg’s 
classes and inscriptions for a collection of arts and wonders enabled multiple systems of order to 
operate simultaneously. The complexity of Quiccheberg’s classification system not only 
challenges the stereotype of the Wunderkammer as a random assortment of unrelated objects, but 
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also suggests that the ontological and epistemological boundaries upon which Quiccheberg’s 
Wunderkammer operated were far from flat. In lieu of listing its strange and marvelous contents, 
perhaps future studies of the Wunderkammer might focus instead on the complex conceptual and 











Toward a Media History of the Wunderkammer 
 
 
“We can imagine how Quiccheberg would have appreciated the flexibility of hypertext. He 
would also, no doubt, have loved to surf the Internet. He would have appreciated the sense 
of having access to all that is known and knowable at his fingertips.”  
—Mark A. Meadow 
 
 
Like Meadow, I think Quiccheberg would find the Internet a useful tool, especially for 
communicating with distant colleagues, coordinating the exchange of artifacts for collections, and 
publishing verbosely-titled treatises. Most of all, I imagine he would appreciate the Internet for its 
searching, cataloguing, and sorting capabilities. Indeed, Quiccheberg would likely find the Internet 
wonderful (in our present-day sense of ‘extremely pleasing’). But I am not so sure he would 
describe it as a ‘Wunderkammer’. 
 Would Quiccheberg have perceived a sense of omniscience, of being able to access all 
there is to know, were he to interface with a web browser? Given that his conception of knowledge 
depends upon sensory engagement with a variety of forms, this seems unlikely. Quiccheberg’s 
ideal Wunderkammer enabled one to not only see, but also touch (and perhaps smell) the artifacts 
it contained. The sensory experience involved in physically arranging and rearranging the 
Wunderkammer’s contents was integral to producing knowledge by rendering visible their formal 
resemblances. In this vein, would Quiccheberg perceive web-based digital media like YouTube or 
Flickr or Facebook as collections of heterogeneous information, or would he balk at the idea that 
the World Wide Web could contain the whole world given that it only holds things in digital form?  
 Perhaps what would interest Quiccheberg most about the Internet is precisely what has thus 
far escaped the attention of new media scholars who liken it to a Wunderkammer: its physical 
architecture and infrastructure. As discussed in chapter three, for sixteenth-century intellectuals, 
the physical structure of knowledge was inextricable from its conceptual organization. How would 
Quiccheberg interpret twenty-first century knowledge based on the myriad devices, fibre optic 






While contemporary discussions of the physical topology of the Internet tend to hinge on questions 
of how to diminish the ‘digital divide’ in an effort to make information—discrete bits of 
transferable data—more accessible to a greater number of people, Quiccheberg was unconcerned 
with issues of social inequality and accessibility. In fact, he would likely be disturbed by the fact 
that most scholars today conceive of knowledge as something that ought to be produced and shared 
by all members of society; his ideal Wunderkammer was explicitly designed to ensure that 
universal knowledge remained the domain of elites who were granted access by divine right.  
As Quiccheberg suggests, the purpose of comparison is not to demonstrate either identity 
or non-identity. Comparing things from different cultures, historical eras, geographical regions, 
and contexts of use is helpful for articulating the sometimes superficial or tacit similarities that 
make classifying anything (including ‘media’) possible in the first place, and for highlighting 
discontinuities between apparently similar things. At first glance, the Web and the Wunderkammer 
may appear to share a similar mode of knowledge production, one that represents reality as an 
assortment of heterogeneous information arranged according to user-generated categories. 
However, Quiccheberg’s guide reveals that the concepts and practices that made his ideal 
Wunderkammer epistemologically productive—such as experience, classification, and 
heterogeneity—are not only distinct but also, in some cases, antithetical to new media scholars’ 
attempts to reform digital media as subversive and accessible means of creating and sharing 
information. Although the ‘digital Wunderkammer’ might be a useful heuristic device for thinking 
through the challenges posed by digital media today, the non-linear effects of this remediation 
reinforce a version of the late Renaissance Wunderkammer that is conspicuously absent from 
Inscriptiones. For the most part, this digital version affirms the traditional interpretation of the 
Wunderkammer as a predecessor of the modern museum but does so as a celebration rather than 
denigration of its apparently random order and lack of stable epistemological boundaries. In 
contrast, the Wunderkammer proposed in Inscriptiones contains an abundance—perhaps an 
excess—of hierarchies. Quiccheberg’s meticulous instructions and lengthy discussions of the 
various ways in which one might achieve a universal collection—that is, a collection in which all 
objects are linked to one another—suggest that the epistemic value of classification depends upon 
it being an ongoing practical task. Furthermore, rather than indicating the absence of modern 






Wunderkammer is granted by the divinely ordered macrocosm. The emergence of the ‘digital 
Wunderkammer’ thus illustrates the twin tendencies to see the past in terms of the present and to 
think of new media as destined to solve the problems created by older—and therefore less 
‘complex’—media (similar to how Quiccheberg presented his Wunderkammer as an improved 
version of Solomon’s House of Wisdom). 
Of course, Quiccheberg did not propose his Wunderkammer with the explicit intention of 
studying a category of phenomena called ‘media’. However, as I hope this analysis of Inscriptiones 
illustrates, his ideal Wunderkammer was intended to provide a method of inquiry into concepts 
and practices we now readily associate with media studies: amplifying the senses, leveraging space 
and time, representing the world, and rendering the invisible visible. Indeed, in delineating a 
classification system for potential Wunderkammern, Quiccheberg’s guide is rife with reflections—
sometimes enigmatic and nebulous—on the kinds of questions that are typically raised by media 
scholars: What counts as art? What counts as nature? What counts as knowledge? What counts? 
Quiccheberg’s Inscriptiones provides a rich source for analyzing how these questions were framed 
before ‘media’ assumed the technological and theoretical baggage it carries today.  
Rasmussen and Stock argue that although medieval and early modern reflections on media 
often appear fragmented and lacking in terminological consistency, this should not shy media 
scholars away from their study.199 The lack of an established approach to media and mediation in 
medieval and early modern sources can illuminate the ways in which our own “powerful, complex 
modern theories may have obscured our ability to discern [] understandings of media that differ 
radically from our own.”200 Rather than approaching the late Renaissance as a period of 
‘amediality’, future media histories of the Wunderkammer could explore how its specific 
differences with regard to mediation were constituted while simultaneously recognizing that 
because the Wunderkammer operated within a frame of reference distinct from our own, as Martin 
emphasizes, “the specifics of these [differences] may not—and perhaps should not—be fully 
grasped.”⁠1 In other words, instead of trying to negate or subsume the Wunderkammer within our 
own analytic frameworks, its study provides a useful source for critiques of the frameworks and 
concepts that today seem central to media studies—including ‘media’ itself. Thus, by way of 
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conclusion—or in lieu of one—the remainder of this chapter identifies a few potential paths along 
which future media histories of the Wunderkammer might travel.  
*** 
As discussed in chapter one, the Wunderkammer’s theological orientation has contributed to its 
characterization as a disorderly and illegitimate form of knowledge production, as the grouping 
together of great works of art and scientific instruments with religious relics and magical stones 
violate the epistemological terms and conditions of modernity. Perhaps its entanglement with 
religion and theology has likewise contributed to the neglect of the Wunderkammer in media 
studies, a field whose most well-known objects of study—such as film, TV, radio, photography, 
and telegraphy—are commonly associated with historical processes of modernization and 
secularization. Ernst, for example, points directly to the Wunderkammer’s reliance on God’s 
divine order in order to explain its distinction from digital media, which “exist[]without such 
theological background; image clusters are organized by algorithms which are known to the human 
programmer and have been ‘embodied’…in machine operations.” 201 Putting aside, for a moment, 
the rather loaded question of the agential capacity of algorithms (or lack thereof), it is worth 
dwelling upon our classifications of media as either ‘secular’ or ‘religious’. In justifying his 
classification of the Wunderkammer outside the boundaries of modern electronic media, Ernst 
draws on an unqualified stereotype of the ‘premodern’ world as being overlaid by some sort of 
homogeneously religious blanket. This not only underestimates how religion reciprocally informs 
contemporary media practice and theory, but also obscures the multiplicity of medieval and early 
modern religion (not to mention the myriad varieties of secularism).202  To say that 
Wunderkammern in general emerged from a religious worldview does nothing to explain the 
practical distinctions with regard to how particular collections were organized, displayed, and 
used. These practical distinctions might be better understood through a comparison of 
Quiccheberg’s guide with other such proposals about the proper organization and use of 
collections.  
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One such proposal was written by a contemporary of Quiccheberg, Gabriel Kaltemarckt, 
who in 1587 published instructions for how Elector Christian I of Saxony might improve the 
collection of his predecessor, Elector Augustus I. Augustus’ collections consisted primarily of 
instrumentation pertaining to the liberal arts, as well as the tools of artisans and merchants (artifacts 
that Quiccheberg would for the most part categorize under his fourth class and, to a lesser extent, 
his second class), and altogether held over 10,000 items as of 1587.203 Tools and instruments 
constituted more than 75 percent of the collection’s contents, while pictures, sculptures, and other 
artworks accounted for only 1.5 percent of the collections.204 Kaltemarckt sought to radically alter 
the focus of the Dresden collection so that it would be dedicated primarily to the works of great 
artists (especially Italian ones), rather than natural artifacts and instrumentation. He sought to turn 
the collection exclusively toward artistic objects—that is, he sought to develop a Kunstkammer 
(art chamber) or Bilderkammer (picture chamber), rather than a more inclusive Wunderkammer. 
A media history of the Wunderkammer might compare Kaltemarckt and Quiccheberg’s attitudes 
toward what a ‘proper’ princely collection contains and how it should be organized in order to 
discern how these differences in representational strategies were informed by the state-sanctioned 
religious programs of their beneficiaries: Duke Albrecht V, a key figure in the German counter-
reformation, and Christian I, whose Kunstkammer helped to define his Lutheran position as an 
alternative to both Catholicism and Calvinism.205  
Returning to the question of algorithmic agency raised above, I wonder whether in the 
wake of ‘the nonhuman turn’206 the distinctions between Wunderkammern and digital media can 
be explained convincingly in terms of the enchanted (theologically or otherwise) premodern world 
and the disenchanted modern world—an historical narrative that relies (perhaps paradoxically) on 
an understanding of media technologies qua agents of secularization and modernization. Whereas 
the traditional story of modernity as a gradual process of disenchantment posits “a fundamental 
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divide between human and nonhuman agents”207 and thus puts media technologies on an 
ontological rung below humans (but above nature), contemporary scholars are crafting critical 
counter-tales and reevaluating the agential capacities of humans as well as nonhumans.208 The 
rigid ontological division between ‘humans’, on the one hand, and ‘nonhumans’, on the other, no 
longer seems to make sense (nor does this anthropocentric idiom—it seems unlikely that a tree, a 
worm, or an octopus would use such a dualistic expression). Moreover, the increasingly popular 
conception of agency as an emergent effect of heterogeneous assemblages—and of media as 
exemplars of agency as an emergent effect—adds to the urgency for media histories of the 
Wunderkammer.209 Perhaps other participants (human or non) in the sixteenth-century collections 
of artificialia and naturalia would make interesting protagonists for such counter-narratives or—
at the very least—remind us, as Quiccheberg does, not to assume that the appearance of 
heterogeneous nature-culture hybrids indicates ontological pluralism or an attunement to 
difference. 
Furthermore, in challenging dominant assumptions about religion, secularization, and non-
human agencies, media histories of the Wunderkammer could provide an entry point into a broader 
discussion about periodization. Despite the fact that the Wunderkammer emerged about a hundred 
years after the printing press—a technology that has come to seem nearly synonymous with 
modernity itself—it has not typically been understood as modern, perhaps due in part to its 
characterization as an adolescent version of the museum. If not its temporal origins, what exactly 
makes the printing press seem more ‘modern’ than the Wunderkammer? Exploring how the history 
of the Wunderkammer and that of the printing press intersect and diverge would further illuminate 
historical discontinuities with respect to media and mediation, with Quiccheberg’s Inscriptiones—
in which he recommends that a Wunderkammer contain print type and printer’s ink (class four, 
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inscription three) and be located near the royal court’s printing shop—providing one potential 
point of departure.  
As the boundary between nature and culture is re-examined and reformed across the 
humanities and social sciences today, media theorists are looking to STEM fields and to nature 
itself as key sources in their research, especially in regards to questions about the conditions of 
knowledge production. Lisa Gitelman, for example, looks to particle physics in order to explore 
how the conditions of inquiry—increasingly digital and networked—influence the nature of the 
humanities today.210  Similarly, Siegfried Zielinski, in calling attention to the ‘deep time of the 
media’, derives his theoretical orientation from the fields of geology, zoology, and paleontology—
a move that has inspired Jussi Parikka, among others, to develop a ‘geology of media’ which 
deliberately conflates media history with earth history.211 “Nature,” observes John Durham Peters, 
“turns out to be profoundly historical.”212 This is not a new discovery but, as Peters’ theory of 
elemental media makes clear, a rediscovery of a very old idea—one that was also (re)discovered 
in and through the Wunderkammer during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. According to 
Bredekamp, the collection and display of artifacts and natural specimens from antiquity to the 
early modern period enabled “a kind of dynamic historical reflection” which suggested that nature 
was not static and unchanging but developed progressively over time.213 This discovery of the 
historicity of nature was made possible precisely because the Wunderkammer represented an 
‘unnatural nature’ that grouped together things that could not coexist naturally.   
The prerogative of the Wunderkammer to simultaneously hold multiple bodies—including 
both metaphorical bodies of knowledge and literal bodies (human and nonhuman; living, dead, 
and inanimate)—as well as various unattached appendages, depended upon collectors’ desire to 
articulate more precisely the interrelationships between different areas of inquiry within the ‘circle 
of learning’.214 For all the talk of interdiscipinarity today, the ‘inters’ between disciplines are still 
in the process of being articulated, as illustrated by the debates over whether and how medieval 
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and early modern historians can study a category of phenomena now called ‘media’ without eliding 
historiocultural specificities. Media histories of the Wunderkammer could provide models for 
thinking about and especially practicing interdisciplinarity by identifying potential points of 
exchange between, for instance, medieval and early modern historians, media theorists, religious 
studies scholars, sociologists and philosophers of science and technology, and research-creation 
practitioners. Perhaps the blurry boundary between nature and culture today might become more 
focused if examined through the lens of another historical moment in which this boundary was 
being enthusiastically arranged and re-arranged. Confrontations between old and new media are 
the crux (and crutch) of these boundary negotiations. In other words, media are both the terms 
being negotiated and conditions in which these negotiations are made. As W.J.T. Mitchell reminds 
us, “We not only think about media, we think in them.”215 While it may not be possible to think in 
a Wunderkammer today, thinking about the Wunderkammer in other media—whether digital or 
not—highlights the reflexive nature of media as historical subjects and serves as a welcome 
reminder that the conditions and categories of inquiry shape the kinds of media histories that can 
be produced. What kind of Wunderkammern might future media histories produce? 
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